How to Democratize Hong Kong

Hong Kong has never been a democracy and it is certainly not one now. It has, in fact, become decidedly less democratic in the last few years. And that is a reason for the friends of a democratic Hong Kong to feel down-hearted. But there is no need for despair. There is need rather for a strategic retreat and for tactical rethinking.

Democracy is, after all, more than a governmental system; it is, first of all, an ideal – one  that  is never fully realized but can only be approximated. It is the ideal of a group of people who together rule themselves. This is most easily pursued in a small group of mature, informed, and like-minded people. But states and, in particular, modern states are not like this. There are vast numbers of citizen of all ages in all kinds of condition, with degrees of knowledge or ignorance, who are anything but like-minded. The ideal of democracy thus becomes easily confused. And, worse, we lose sight of what lies behind it which is a conception of human nature as capable of a proud self-determination.

No political order, whatever its arrangements may be, can be considered genuinely democratic unless it is animated by this understanding of human nature and by the consequent ideal of shared self-rule. In order for a society to be democratic, the ideal of democracy must, in other words, be a live idea to its members. They must, moreover, be willing and able to relate to each other in terms of this ideal. They must be capable of a democratic practice not just at the level of government but in their daily interactions. Only in this way can a democratic politics be most fully realized.

There is today no democratic politics in Hong Kong. But it is still possible to foster the idea of human self-determination, to engage in democratic practices, and to nurture the ideal of democratic rule.  To this end it is all important that there still exists in Hong Kong today the opportunity for association. The time for protest marches may be over; the electoral and legislative process has been stripped of its democratic elements; policy is no longer made by Hong Kongers themselves but by patriots in Beijing. There are, however, still ways to nurture the spirit of democracy and that has to be the task now for dedicated Hong Kong democrats. There are a number of ways this task can be pursued. Here are six thoughts on this topic.

  • Associate with others dedicated like you to the exploration of democratic ideals. Democracy is a social ideal built not only on the notion of self-rule but also that of mutual support. You can have democratic thoughts when you are alone. But you cannot be a democrat on your own.
  • You don’t need to fret all the time about Hong Kong or Chinese politics. Devote yourself, instead, to the study of other times and places: the development of democracy in ancient Greece; the French Revolution and its aftermath; the founding of the American Republic. There are important elements of democracy to be found even in early Chinese history. Look for them.
  • Study political philosophy. Reading Aristotle’s Politics and Ethics might be a starting point. Combine this with Aristotle account of the democratic constitution of Athens. Read Hegel’s Philosophy of Right together with Marx’s critical notes on that book. Read Hannah Arendt. They all open your eyes to other and broader ways of thinking about politics. Authoritarians want you to believe that there is no alternative to the status quo. It is important to see how wrong they are.
  • Learn from those who have lived under authoritarian regimes how to say things without exposing yourself to danger. One can write or speak about ancient Egypt and mean the here and now. Make the spaces between your words do the work. Be eloquent with your silences.
  • See your opponents not as oppressors, which they certainly are, but as victims of a narrow and demeaning view of themselves, of what it is to be human. Pity them, not for the constraints they impose on the liberty of others, but their own inner lack of freedom.
  • Above all, make sure that you and your group rule themselves in a democratic fashion. Be aware of the danger of being undemocratic in the pursuit of democracy. Practice democracy locally, in relation to those next to you. Make this the ferment that will eventually transform all of society.
  • Finally, remember that all this takes time (A generation? A century?). Be patient. In the drought my nasturtiums died in the garden. But now the rain has brought them back and we can suddenly hope to see them bloom again.

The Triumph of Institutional Nihilism: Hong Kong’s new M+ Museum

On the outside Hong Kong’s new M+ museum has all the charm of a cigarette box; inside it is as heart-warming as an oversized car garage.  There is nothing intimate, personal, attractive, alive, or memorable about this building. Many years in the planning and fantastically expensive, it is a structure without recognizable architectural merit put into an anonymous development area, the work of an over-rated firm from Switzerland. Herzog & de Meuron is the current go-to place for the kind of people who commission new museums across the globe and it is responsible for a series of architectural disasters such as San Francisco’s De Young Museum and the Vancouver Art Gallery. The Hong Kong museum now joins that group. It is part of a new institutional genre representing the full marketizing of “art” and “culture” for the sake of governments and corporations who see a need to adorn themselves, for millionaire and billionaire “benefactors” who are trying to enhance their financial and reputational status, and for “art professionals” set on making a decent living from all this. M+, like its sister institutions, is in fact nothing but a monument to a cold institutional nihilism.

M+ is the dream project of Hong Kong bureaucrats with no special taste for art but determined to put Hong-Kong on the “artistic” map. According to the bloated promotional verbiage the new building is already “among Hong Kong’s most iconic landmarks, both monumental in its architectural form and radically open in its position in the urban landscape.”  Iconic, certainly not; and does the phrase “both monumental … and radically open” mean anything?  Anyone who has actually stumbled through the concrete wilderness of the area will equally wonder about the implausible claim that “the West Kowloon Cultural District is one of the largest and most ambitious cultural projects in the world.” The new museum is, in reality, meant to bolster Hong Kong’s increasingly dubious claim to being “Asia’s world city.” It is intended to draw tourists who have otherwise not much to look at in this city where so many traces of the past have been obliterated or ruined. It is also meant to confirm the city’s claim to being an international art market. And in this description, it is the words “international” and “market” that matter. What Hong Kong’s thoroughly parochial bureaucracy has produced has little to do with art. There is a real art scene in Hong Kong but it is far from this museum and not large enough to establish a local identity on which a living museum could be built. The M+ that Hong Kong has ended up with is, in effect, no more special than K 11 or IFC 1 or any other of its many shopping malls – the only difference being that it is unlikely to draw the same crowds.

How Hong Kong became a police state

September 19, 2021

The first round of a so-called “election” process under a new National Security Law has just taken place in Hong Kong. Out of a population of 7,5 million inhabitants, just 4,800 were qualified to be voters. The process has, in fact, more of the character of an appointment process than of an election. All the candidates have been carefully vetted. They were ultimately cleared as the result of a police investigation. It is evident then that the final controlling authority in Hong Kong is today the national security police. The most powerful figure in the city is a former policeman, John Lee, who now serves as the security minister. Carrie Lam, the official chief executive of Hong Kong, has been demoted to being the spokesperson for the new regime.

 

This transformation of Hong Kong is surprising since it has been brought about by the authorities in Beijing — and mainland China is not a police state. It is, rather, a Party state in which the Communist Party determines who represents the people and who rules. Beijing obviously decided not to remold Hong Kong at this moment in the image of the mainland. The goal was, rather, to preserve the “one country, two system” principle enshrined in the Basic Law, but in a profoundly altered fashion. Some kind of rudimentary election process was to be maintained. One might call it a veneer. But that still leaves the question who was likely to be deceived by it. Certainly not the democratic states around the world with their wide-open election systems. And it is difficult to imagine that the citizens of Hong Kong would be impressed by this “improvement” (as Carrie Lam has called it) of the democratic process. Being stripped of a right you have previously had is unlikely to be seen by anyone as an improvement.

 

The police state system in Hong Kong is, rather, the outcome of a twofold thought in the minds of the Beijing rulers. The first part of it is that some kind of electoral process may, indeed, serve a positive purpose. (But which one?) And that means that the Communist Party cannot officially be given a hegemonic status in the city. The second part of the thought is that Beijing must keep tight control over what happens in Hong Kong. The electoral process must thus be subjected to the most stringent controls. This requires the creation of a new controlling body, the national security police, which will, of course, have to be acting strictly on behalf of the Beijing authorities. The Hong Kong police state must be under the control of the Beijing party state. The result is the Byzantine mechanism now in place meant to make sure that that the “patriots” selected will serve the purposes of the central government.

 

It is difficult to imagine that this system will continue for long since it is so counter-intuitive. As Hong Kong is integrated more and more into China, as Beijing clearly intends to do, some kind of decision will have to be made. One possibility is the complete abandonment of Hong Kong’s Basic Law and the expansion of the party state into the city. The other is a reform of the political system of the mainland to include an electoral element under tight control – that is, the extension of the police state to all of China.

The Private and the Public. What we can learn from Wittgenstein

On a Canadian website devoted to the translation of writings by contemporary Chinese intellectuals, its creator, David Ownby of the University of Montréal, writes: “China is, if not totalitarian, surely authoritarian, and I readily admit that I do not fully understand the relationship between the Chinese state and the intellectuals I study.  It is obvious that their published work is not a perfect reflection of their private thoughts, which surely means that many times they cannot say what they really think, but what trade-offs they make and how they make their calculations remain obscure.  While I prefer to believe that what they publish is a fair if perhaps partial reflection of what they think, many people do not, and I admit that now and again I wonder if I’m being played.”[1]

Those living in repressive societies will be familiar with the distinction between what they feel able to say or write and what they must keep to themselves. And they will also know to distinguish between what is written or said and the private thoughts of its author. The distinction is, in fact, known to all of us even in so-called free societies. Considerations of prudence, politeness, propriety, shame or guilt make us refrain from giving expression to many things we think or feel or they get us, at least, to modify and tame our words. I may not tell my boss what exactly I think of him for reasons of prudence. I may not give voice to the pain I feel in order not to upset my companions. I may not comment aloud on a lecture in progress for reasons of propriety. I may not use the swear word that has come to my mind for reasons of politeness.  But we also look at others and wonder whether any of those reasons have made them be silent about their inner feelings and thoughts or circumspect in expressing them. We describe the distinction that opens up in this way as one between the public and the private. Thoughts and feelings are private, we say, whereas words and actions are public.

I want to talk here about Wittgenstein’s remarks on privacy in his Philosophical Investigations but will do so in a roundabout manner. For his thoughts are narrowly focused on issues in the philosophy of mind and concern, so it seems, only what privacy is not. In his Blue Book Wittgenstein characterizes the proposition ‘A man’s sense data are private to himself’ as both metaphysical and misleading and he describes his own undertaking as an attempt to rid us “of the temptation to look for a particular act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some peculiar medium.”[2] The formulation is awkward because it sounds, as if Wittgenstein meant to deny the distinction between thought and its expression. The Chinese intellectuals of whom Owenby speaks and, in fact, all those living in repressive societies will easily disabuse us of that idea. But Wittgenstein’s point is not to deny the existence of unexpressed thought; it is rather to deny their existence in a peculiar medium. His goal is, in other words, to dismantle Descartes’ metaphysics of mind and body. But as he focuses so sharply on this issue, he entirely bypasses the social and political aspects of the private-public distinction. I consider it useful to look first at the broader context in which that distinction occurs in order to situate Wittgenstein’s considerations in it and to ask only afterwards about the practical import of what he writes.

The first thing to note is that the term “private” has a wide range of uses and certainly a wider one than Wittgenstein acknowledges. We do, of course, speak of unexpressed thoughts and feelings as private. But we can also keep a private diary that records those thoughts and feelings and we can engage in a private conversation with close friends and associates. And there are other, broader uses of the term. My letter to the public media is considered my private opinion if I am not speaking in an official capacity. We have private phone numbers in addition to job related ones, and these may be listed as such in a public directory. The home is my private domain, but everyone in the family may also have their own private bedroom and we all treat the shared toilet as private.  There are private membership clubs whose doors  display the words “STRICTLY PRIVATE.” There are private collections of art that are shown in public. There are private businesses that operate as publicly registered companies. The private is, in these cases, what is unexpressed, what is personal, what is meant only for a few, what is of limited access, what is shameful, what is not official, what is owned by me, what is for my own use, what is a personal pursuit and not a business, and finally even what is a business but not traded on the stock market and not owned by the state. The private is, in other words, many different things and the boundary between the public and the private falls accordingly in different places. Note also that something can therefore be private in some sense and at the same time public and thus not private in another.

Wittgenstein wonders in his Philosophical Investigations what it is to say that sensations are private. An interlocutor insists that this means that “only I can know whether I am in pain; another person can only surmise it.” But Wittgenstein dismissively retorts: “In one sense this is false, and in another nonsense.”[3] In an adjoining passage, he considers the possibility of a private language which he describes as follows: “The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know – to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.” (PI, 243) The two passages raise various questions about the notion of privacy. The “privacy” of our sensations and the “privacy” of the private language are obviously not the same thing, though they are related. The private sensation is assumed to be private by being “in the mind”; the private language is not in the mind, but it’s subject-matter is said to be private. The words “can” and “cannot” in the cited passages alerts us to further meanings of privacy. The private is that which another person cannot know. The private language is one which only the speaker can understand. Of what kind of “can” do these sentences speak? Are we to think of logical, physical, physiological, or psychological possibility? Think of these three examples: Chinese intellectuals cannot say everything they think. We cannot say who invented the wheel. I cannot adequately describe the sunset. In the first case, the “cannot” is due to a threat of sanctions; in the second to a lack of historical knowledge; in the third to the limitations of my vocabulary. Not only the word “private” but also the words “can” and “cannot” have multiple meanings and these introduce inflections into the meaning of privacy.

Speaking privately

We will find it easier to consider initially the idea of a private language and only then the privacy of thoughts and feelings. Can there be such a thing as a private language? In some sense of the word “private, the answer is: obviously yes. It is clearly not difficult to set up a language which only I understand, my own private code. Wittgenstein himself occasionally used a code to keep his thoughts hidden from prying eyes – though the code proves, in fact, easy enough to decipher. Criminal gangs, underground political parties, and anybody else who wants to keep a secret will often devise a code for their own private use. This may not be what Wittgenstein has in mind as a private language, but thinking about what it means to be able or not to be able to decipher a coded language throws light on the different ways in which we use the word “can” that Wittgenstein employs in his formulations.

If it is possible to decipher Wittgenstein’s code, in what sense can it be called private? The experts tell us that there is, in fact, only one unbreakable code and thus, only one inherently private language in the sense right now under consideration. Invented by Gilbert Vernam for use in the First World War, the code requires a key that can be used only once and must consists of a series of genuinely random numbers longer than the message to be encrypted. Those requirements make the code, however, practically useless. In encrypting messages for the internet, we use therefore codes that are in principle breakable but (hopefully) not in practice because the deciphering would take too long or we currently lack the computing power to do so. We are distinguishing thus two kinds of possibility and impossibility and thus two notions of privacy. There is what one can do or not do in principle and what we can or cannot do in practice. We may want to add here a further distinction between two kinds of practical possibility or impossibility. Something may be practically impossible for incidental reasons as when I can’t decipher a code because I am too sleepy. But the deciphering may also be impossible for reasons intrinsic to the code as that it would take five hundred years to break it. We can distinguish thus three kinds of potentiality (possibility/impossibility): potentiality in principle, practical incidental potentiality, and practical intrinsic potentiality.  Only the Vernam code is in principle unbreakable. Wittgenstein’s own code is easily broken and only some incidental reason will stop s from breaking it. But the code that is meant to secure the internet is not only unbreakable in practice but hopefully so for intrinsic reasons. We can call this third type of code also in principle practically unbreakable. We will see in due course that this three-fold distinction is helpful when thinking about Wittgenstein’s reflections on privacy.

I have spoken so far of how we keep thoughts and feelings private by not expressing them or by expressing them in a secret code. We can also attain privacy of a sort by restricting access to the expression of thought or feeling. I can keep a diary and hide it away in a hole underneath the floor so that only I have access to it. I can reveal my thoughts and feelings only to a circle of close confidants. We call an expression of thought or feeling public in this context when it is left open to whom it is addressed. Much of our speaking and writing is not in fact public in this sense and is not meant to be. What I say at my kitchen table is likely to stay there and is, in any case, intended only for those immediately present. The note I pass to you under the desk is meant for your eyes only. Both my kitchen table remarks and the note I send you are private in intention and, hopefully, also in fact. Much of our speaking and reading is of this sort. Our expressions of thought or feeling are, as a matter of fact, not promulgated to everybody and are commonly meant only for those specifically addressed. The assumption that our words have for the most part only a specific range is, in fact, inherent in and even constitutive of our common linguistic practice. Politicians, preachers, novelists, actors, and others of that sort may aspire to speak to the broad public but even that public has a specific range in that it consists of citizen, the faithful, the literate, theatergoers, etc.. Only philosophers are tempted to think that they are addressing the universe.

Even when we speak privately, we may, of course, be overheard. An outsider may catch what I say in confidence to a friend. A curious bystander may try to listen in to my private conversation. We may or may not be concerned abut that possibility. I sometimes overhear people in the street discussing their private lives on their cell phones. Long gone is the time of the glazed-in telephone cell. The standards of privacy seem to have changed. But we may still hesitate to let outsiders know of very intimate or embarrassing things or matters; we don’t want them to hear something that would be to our detriment or not in our interest. We operate in a sphere of privacy, but that sphere can grow or diminish according to circumstances. This is part of the ordinary use of language and of other expressive means.

  This should remind us of the fact that the idea of language as a medium of representation is a derivative and belated notion. The fundamental linguistic relation is not “A represents B” but “A communicates B to C.” The first question is never simply: what is said? But always: who is speaking to whom and who is heard by whom. That is a lesson Wittgenstein had to learn after he finished his Tractatus. It is as a result of this lesson Wittgenstein begins his Philosophical Investigations with Augustine’s account of the communicative use of language. It is, in any case, only by paying attention to this aspect of language that we will understand how considerations who is or is not addressed and thus considerations of privacy are integral to its use.

The deprivation of privacy

There are always those who want to know who spoke or wrote what to whom.  This holds in particular of repressive governments which have two reasons for keeping tabs on their people. Having eliminated free expression, public media and debate, polls and elections, such governments find it difficult to judge their citizens’ mood and thinking. To overcome that handicap, they will take active measures to peer into the lives of their citizens. Spying and surveillance become their substitute for the public sphere they have destroyed. The surveillance is, of course, not a purely cognitive undertaking. It is designed, rather, to help the authorities to shape their policies, manipulate the public’s thinking, feeling, and acting, and to ferret out and crush potential opponents. The intervention includes thus a massive intrusion into the privacy sphere of the subjects of surveillance but extends also to their public existence. This does not mean, however, that the division between the private and the public has been obliterated. It has, instead, become relocated and redefined. The results of governmental spying on its own citizens are not generally publicized. The information gained is most often kept in secret files by the secret police and only used when needed. Even the fact of surveillance is often denied or downplayed. The result is a peculiar deformation of the entire  domain of privacy. Boundaries of privacy remain in place between the subjects of surveillance but the government has now inserted itself as an intruder into every individual sphere of privacy and of all the information gained in this manner, it will publicize some and keep other bits private.

Governments are not the only parties keen to discover our private thoughts and feelings. These have also commercial value and the technology of the internet has made it increasingly easier to harvest what is useful and monetizable in them. Economic enterprises thus hack into the confidential data of their competitors. Criminal gangs snoop into private, corporate, and government accounts for purposes of theft and extortion. Companies operating on the internet accumulate information on the users of their services. In each case, the information used to be private in the sense that it was practically inaccessible (for incidental or intrinsic reasons) except to those specifically meant to have it. Technological advances have broken that barrier and have given the unauthorized access. And this naturally redraws the boundary between the public and the private.  The private information gathered by economic enterprises, criminal gangs, and internet companies has not, of course, become public in the sense of being now publicly accessible. Like government spies, those harvesting that information have an interest in keeping the results of their fishing to themselves. The information they have gathered retains its commercial value often only as long as they can keep it secret. The internet provider who exploits our private data is thus genuinely concerned with defending our privacy from other intruders though, of course, not from themselves.  And China’s extensive surveillance program is completely compatible with its recent adopted “Personal Information Protection Law” that seeks to assure the “legitimate rights” of individuals from “the use of new technologies such as user profiling and recommendation algorithms, the use of big data in setting [unfair] prices for frequent customers, and information harassment in the sale of products and services.”[4] Being free from governmental surveillance is, notably, not among those legitimate rights.

Shoshana Zuboff, who has studied the development of what she calls “surveillance capitalism” concludes that “the assault on behavioral data is so sweeping that it can no longer be circumscribed by the concept of privacy and its contests. This is a different kind of challenge now, one that threatens the existential and political canon of the modern liberal order defined by principles of self-determination.”[5]  Zuboff draws in these remarks on Hannah Arendt who has argued that all our classical forms of politics are built on the duality of household or family on one side and city or state on the other.[6]  But is the distinction between household and city the same as that between the private and the public? Were the households of ancient Greece or Rome private in the same sense as a modern home? Is there a distinction between the private and the public in simple tribal societies and their politics? A modern liberal political order certainly assumes the existence of a private domain to which the state has only limited access. Zuboff may be right in worrying that the foundations of this sort of society is threatened. That realization forces us to ask with what kind of politics we may be left, what kind of social order, and with what kind of distinction between the private and the public.

A recent report on China shows what is at stake.[7]  Its two authors have studied procurement documents of local, provincial, and national authorities to determine how surveillance capacities and objectives are changing. They write: “The PRC’s leaders have always excelled at surveilling their countrymen, and [the] lack of a “countervailing price” has allowed them to do so in varied ways over the past 70 years. During the first few decades of the PRC’s existence, the state-controlled labor system tethered workers and their families to their places of employment… Work units served as the eyes of the state, maintaining their residents’ dossiers, compiling information about them at work, at mandatory Party meetings, and in their homes—information often supplied by neighbors and coworkers. Reporting on members of one’s own community reached frenzied heights during the Cultural Revolution, when people had to publicly accuse their acquaintances, friends, and even loved ones of real or imagined political transgressions in order to avoid becoming targets themselves.” The frenzy came to an end in the late 1970s with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms. “For a few decades, Chinese citizens became accustomed to relatively more robust levels of personal privacy.” But the procurement documents reveal that China’s government is now acquiring new tools to help the authorities at every level to monitor large swathes of the population at a time. The authors of the report write that the characterization of China in 2020 as an Orwellian surveillance state “is inaccurate and silly, but it could be reality down the line.”

The surveillance regime is currently most intense in Xinjiang where it operates with frequent ID checks at police cordons, self-incrimination campaigns in re-education camps, and surveillance cameras with face recognition capacity at street corners, police checkpoints, the entrances to mosques, and sometimes in individual homes. Access to printed and digital resources is strictly controlled. The internet is searched to determine who goes to what website, who communicates with whom, and who writes or reads what.  Surveillance is not as extensive in other parts of the country. The Xinjiang system of surveillance is a response, in the first instance, to some 200 terrorist attacks carried out by Uighur radicals in the 1990s. Their radicalism is linked to the Turkestan Islamic Party whose goal is to establish an independent East Turkestan Republic.  The desire for political independence is, in turn, due to the Uighurs’ consciousness of a distinct cultural, religious, and historical identity. The prevention terrorist attacks, the identification of potential troublemakers, The suppression of the secessionist movement, and control of the cultural expression of the region are thus the motivating factors of the surveillance system. In China at large, the system of surveillance is also used, as it is in the West, to prevent and solve ordinary crime, and to regulate public services, and to improve civic planning. The technology is thus seen as essential to the functioning of mass society. But the Chinese authorities’ understanding of what a well-ordered society should look like is peculiarly constricted. There must be no questioning of the status of the Communist Party. The bureaucratic state must not be challenged. Certain topics cannot be publicly discussed. “Politically harmful information” must be policed.[8] Yet another purposes the surveillance system serves is as a source of information for an envisaged social credit system. The system is meant to punish or reward Chinese citizens for socially detrimental or socially beneficial  behavior. Among the detrimental forms of behavior have been listed smoking violations, playing loud music, and eating on rapid transits, as well as jaywalking, failing to correctly sort personal waste, and even making reservations at restaurants or hotels without showing up, in addition, of course, to more serious matters such as fraudulent financial behavior and crime in general. Volunteering for community services, donating blood, and praising government efforts on social media have, on the other hand, been listed as deserving social credit rewards.[9] To gather relevant information the social credit system has to rely on mass surveillance systems, facial recognition software, big data analysis, and artificial intelligence. The envisaged system approximates the function, though not the layout and technology, of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon and sis meant to establish a society that is both disciplinary and biopolitical in character, to use Michel Foucault’s language. In addition to mass surveillance for policy purposes and the individualized surveillance is support of system of social control, there is finally the sharply focused surveillance of suspected or potential dissidents. It is in this last form of surveillance that the intrusion into the target’s sphere of privacy is most pronounced. The agents of this sort of surveillance want to find out not only what their targets say or write or but wan to penetrate also into the inner space of their private thoughts and feelings.

What would the expansion of this technology that is suggested by the Chinese procurement documents mean? “Would there be any semblance of privacy left—the sort of going-about-one’s-business, blend-into-the-crowd privacy that many of us implicitly expect in public spaces—to people living in the PRC? What does it portend for public spaces beyond China’s borders? A number of democracies are already struggling with the implications of these technologies, which often pit a desire for public security against an expectation of privacy and consent. What happens as China normalizes, or sells, these technologies to places where public debate about them is quashed before it can occur? Will PRC surveillance tech strengthen the wave of authoritarian governance that seems to be rolling across the globe?”[10]

Surveillance government and surveillance capitalism do not form a single institutional whole. They are often even at odds with each other. Functionally they belong nonetheless together. We still tend to think about politics in terms of its institutions and distinguish between the public institutions of the state and private corporate institutions. But politics is perhaps better looked at as a process involving the organized exercise of power and institutions are better understood as being among the products and instruments of that process. Surveillance government and surveillance capitalism both exercise power with the help of newly developed technological means that to some extent obliterate, to some extent weaken, and to some extent relocate various distinctions between the public and the private. Surveillance government and surveillance capitalism produce in in this way comparable effects. We see in this development the emergence of a system of power relations that overrides the traditional distinction between public political and private economic enterprises .We can cll the emerging formation provisionally by the name of “the corporāte.”[11] The history of the modern state has been described as a process of emancipation of economics from politics which has reached ts epitome in the free-market system of modern capitalism. If this were true, the historical process would mark the triumph of the private over the public. But the endpoint of this process has proved to be not a neo-liberal nirvana of complete economic autonomy but (in different forms in China and the West) the convergence of state and corporate power – neither liberal nor socialist, neither public nor private, the amalgamation of the two into the functional syndrome of the corporāte.

Private sensations

Will there be any privacy left in the corporāte? I return at this point to Wittgenstein’s examination of privacy. It will be obvious to any careful reader that Wittgenstein doesn’t use the term “private language” to refer to an encoded language or one that is restricted in its use.  The language whose possibility he considers is supposed to be private rather in the sense that its content is private. The words of this language, he says, are meant to refer to “immediate private sensations” and thus to something that “only the speaker can know.”  We must turn then to the idea of the privacy of sensations and to the thought that these can only be known by the speaker, that is by the one who has the sensations and who says that he has them. If our inner states truly have that characteristic, it appears that there is a sphere of privacy that cannot be punctured by any kind of surveillance.

But Wittgenstein seeks to reject this idea of absolute privacy. And that raises the question whether anything stands in the way of the complete surveillance and control of our most private thoughts and feelings. Is there any possible escape from surveillance and any possibility of resistance to the power of the corporāte? Can there still be a sphere of privacy protected from the intrusions of the corporāte?

Wittgenstein dismisses the claim that only the person who says “I am in pain” can know what his words mean: “It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know that I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean – except perhaps that I am in pain.”  I am not sure that we want to agree with this line of thinking. Is it in principle impossible to have knowledge of one’s own pain and why would that be so? We can certainly say “I remember I was in terrible pain when I had that kidney stone some years ago” and that utterance appears to be in all respects an expression of knowledge. But what then prevents me from having knowledge also of my present pain? Wittgenstein is right, however, in saying that being in pain is not the same as knowing that one is. I don’t mean here that the pain might be unconscious, but that having a consciousness of pain is still different from knowing that one has that pain. Feeling pain is not a state of cognition and we can add that thinking is also not the same as knowing that one has thoughts. But isn’t it possible that I am in pain in the sense of feeling it and also know that I am in pain? Feeling drunk and realizing that one is drunk are not the same. Similarly, I may have a thought and recall at the same time that I have had that same thought before. But why does Wittgenstein even raise the question whether the person who feels pain or thinks can know that he does? The decisive point is, after all, the question whether another person can know this. And here Wittgenstein is obviously right when he says: “If we are using the word ‘know’ as it is normally used, … then other people very often know if I’m in pain.” The interlocutor who insists on the absolute privacy of sensations objects at this point that another person cannot have that knowledge “with the certainty with which I know it myself.” That may or may not be true. But it does not bolster the interlocutor’s claim. Knowledge does not require absolute certainty. Otherwise, there would be no empirical knowledge.

On the view that Wittgenstein’s interlocutor advances we cannot have real knowledge of another person’s feelings because these are located in a sphere which is in principle inaccessible to others.  And this view may, in turn, be backed up by the Cartesian assumption of two different substances. But Cartesian dualism is not essential for the claim that what is in the mind is inaccessible to others. I don’t believe that Descartes himself actually assumed such an inaccessibiity. According to Wittgenstein’s interlocutor, however, the inaccessibility thesis means that the only thing others can know are verbal or behavioral expressions of private sensations. The interlocutor concludes that one can only make tenuous extrapolations about the other’s inner feelings from those expressions. But if we can in principle know nothing about the other’s inner states, our statement that the other is in pain can refer only to the other’s words and behavior. The interlocutor who wants to insist on the uniqueness of the inner life, is thus reduced to some kind of behaviorism. He seeks to avoid that behaviorism by concluding that if the other one says “I am in pain” he must be feeling what the interlocutor feels when he says “I am I pain.” But there seems to be no basis for that analogical inference. To avoid the behaviorist turn, we must, instead, follow Wittgenstein and argue that there is no absolute barrier between inner feelings and their external manifestation. The two belong together and we can therefore often know of the private sensations of others. That conclusion leaves many questions open. In particular the question of the exact nature of the link between the inner and the outer. It appears to be, however, the way we avoid the drift into behaviorism. That is ironic, in that Wittgenstein has been often accused of being a behaviorist, despite his claims to the contrary. To the question whether he will admit a difference between pain and pain behavior, Wittgenstein responds firmly in the Philosophical Investigations: “Admit it? What greater difference could there be.” (PI, 304) That there is such a difference does not mean, however, that there is not an inherent link between them. Sensations are not private in principle, though they are practically so in many situations.

Wittgenstein’s interlocutor will presumably want to make his case not only for sensations but also for thoughts. Thoughts, too, are, according to him, located in the private medium of the mind and must therefore be in principle inaccessible to others. All we have, accordingly to the interlocutor, are public expressions of thoughts. And from those, the interlocutor will say, we can tentatively derive conclusions about the inner thoughts. But it is once again difficult to see how the interlocutor can avoid a behaviorist turn. What reasons can he have for assuming that when the other utters the sentence “p” he must be thinking privately what the interlocutor thinks when he utters “p”? Wittgenstein’s rejection of an absolute division between the private thought and its public expression appears the only way to avoid the behaviorist turn.

Being in principle practically private

But let us assume for a moment that the interlocutor can maintain the absolute division between the private and the public which he is after. Can that give us comfort in the face of an expanding surveillance industry? The answer has to be no. The surveillance industry is after all, primarily interested in manipulating the behavior of the subjects of their surveillance and what they seek to survey are, the expressed feelings and thoughts of their subjects. If sensations and thoughts occur only in the absolutely separate sphere of the inner world, they will, presumably, be of small interest to the surveillance regimes. The inaccessible sensations and feelings would be like Wittgenstein’s imagined beetle in the inaccessible box. It would not matter whether they were there or not. The surveillance regime are interested in our thoughts and feelings only because they affect our speaking, writing, and doing. But as soon as we assume that there is such a link, we have abandoned the idea of an absolutely separate private sphere.  Some neuroscientists have suggested that we might one day be able to trace and decipher brain activity and thus gain direct access to people’s sensations and thoughts. But we are are certainly not there as yet and it is not obvious that this can ever be done. In the meantime, the surveillance regimes are busy recording what we say, what we do, where we go, whom we meet, what websites we visit in the hope of being able to control and manipulate our actions.

If the interlocutor is, however, pushed into revising his view and to adopt a form of behaviorism that view will prove to be even more amenable to the surveillance regime. There would then be no reason for it to worry that the secret thoughts and feelings of its subjects might escape surveillance.

Does Wittgenstein’s account offer us a contrasting way of distinguishing between the private and the public that allows us to identify genuine limits to the technology of surveillance? Does it have a place for thinking that there may be space for the privacy of feelings and thoughts and thus for a potential freedom from the intrusiveness of the powers of surveillance and a potential even for resistance to the manipulative power of the corporāte? How could that be? Wittgenstein assumes that there are internal links between the inner phenomena and their outer expression. We can know of other people’s private sensations because there exist natural links between them and their expression. Wittgenstein asks in this spirit whether the statement “I noticed that he was out of his humor” is a report about a person’s behavior or his state of mind. He answers compellingly – I think – that the report is both: “Both, not side by side, however, but from the one through the other.” But note that the published translation says at this point, instead, that the statement is a report “about the one via the other.” (PI, p. 188)  This would mean that the proposition is to be considered a report about a state of mind that has passed through a report on behavior whereas Wittgenstein’s German says more strongly that the proposition is a report on a state of mind by means of or even by reason of being a report on a behavior. Wittgenstein add at this point: “A doctor asks: ‘How is he feeling?’ The nurse says: ‘He is groaning.’ A report on his behavior. But need there be any question for the two of them whether the groaning is genuine and really the expression of something?” (PI, p. 188) And we can similarly speak of a natural link between thoughts and their expression. Does this mean that if there were no possibility of expressing thoughts or feelings they would, inevitably, dwindle away? We would certainly not be able to speak or to conceive of them in the way we do. Wittgenstein: “Look at the stone and imagine it having sensations – One says to oneself: How could one so much as have the idea of ascribing sensations to a thing? … And now look at a wriggling fly, and at once these difficulties vanish, and pain seems able to get a foothold here, where before everything was, so to say, too smooth for it.” (P!, 284)

On Wittgenstein’s account then there is nothing in principle that stands in the way of recognizing another person’s thoughts and feelings. Thoughts and sensations are not hermetically sealed off in an inner world of which others can know nothing. And this is, indeed, essential to the ways we interact and to what kind of beings we are. We can co-operate efficiently with each other and come to each other’s assistance in the way we do only because we can recognize each other’s thoughts and feelings in expression and action. One might look for an evolutionary explanation of why this has to be so. But if this is so, there seem to be no limits to the potential powers of surveillance and our worst fears about the consequences of losing the distinction between the private and the public seem to be realistic.

But that recognition is always limited in reach. There is always the possibility of misunderstanding and misinterpretation, of deception, pretending, acting, and lying. There is always the possibility of keeping one’s thoughts and feelings to oneself. The link between inner thoughts and feelings and their expression is never smooth. Our interactions are for that reason always marked by a degree of uncertainty. We may know another person well and may have known him for years but still be surprised about something he says or does, thinks or feels. That, too, is characteristic of human sociality.

Your thoughts and feelings may not be in principle inaccessible to others. They are not absolutely private. But, in practice, they may not be freely accessible. Consider all the things that go through your mind in the course of a day. None of them may in principle be beyond the reach of being known by others. But that other person would have to be at your side all day long and pay constant attention to everything you do and say, to every frown, every sigh, and every word you whisper. Once we abandon the idea of mind and body as separate substances, it become plausible to think that our mental states will be in principle just as accessible to knowledge as the other states of our bodies. But this knowledge in principle does not come to a knowledge in practice. So, are thoughts and sensations in principle private in the sense of being in principle inaccessible to others? They are accessible in principle but not always practically. And they are practically inaccessible not only for incidental reasons, but intrinsically so. We can say then that they are in principle practically inaccessible. Whether they are or not will depend on the means we have available for following the other’s words and actions. In our normal, everyday interactions there are narrow limits to this. Individuals are thus left to a wide sphere of privacy. The size of that sphere varies, however, according to how close two human beings are. But even between those who are intimate, the sphere of privacy remains intact. And it is, moreover, essential, if the parties will have mutual trust in each other, that this sphere of privacy shrinks to the same degree in both.

Technological means of surveillance have, however, created new ways of following the words and actions of others. Here the penetration into the sphere of privacy becomes one-directional. The agents of surveillance resist being surveilled. The shrinkage of privacy occurs only for the subject surveilled. This must result in a shrinkage of trust since the surveilled subject has less reason to trust the surveillor.  The defenders of governmental surveillance often reason that those who do nothing wrong, will have nothing to fear from surveillance. But that assumes that he surveilling government organs cannot or will not do wrong. Surveillance government and surveillance capitalism are thus likely to spawn a regime of deepening distrust. The technological means of surveillance are not likely to go away; the reality of increased surveillance is with us. The question must be how trust can be maintained in this situation. The simple answer is that there needs to be increasing transparency between the parties. Bu that will not be easy to attain. Repressive governments have an interest in opacity, so do exploitative commercial undertakings, so do criminal gangs. In an age of surveillance, citizens must insist on a form of government that fosters openness and responsiveness to its citizens, that constraints the economic exploitation of the means of surveillance, and that prevents the operation of criminal forms of surveillance. It is difficult to see how any but a genuinely free a democratic form of government could provide such services.

Hiding in plain view

I want to turn here at the end to a passage of the Philosophical Investigations that appears to me relevant to this discussion. Wittgenstein writes there that “we don’t have an overview of the use of our language.”  His next sentence is in German: “Unserer Grammatik fehlt es an Übersichtlichkeit.“ Our published translation makes this: „Our grammar is deficient in surveyability.” I would make it: “Our grammar lacks surveyability.” The difference in wording is due to two different interpretations of the entire remark. The translators (and many other interpreters)  take Wittgenstein’s words to be prescriptive. Our grammar is deficient. We must therefore devise a surveyable representation of it. The interpreters believe tat this is what Wittgenstein is after. I believe, by contrast, that Wittgenstein is speaking  descriptively. I take him seriously when he writes: “Philosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language, so it can in the end only describe it.” (PI, 124) And when he adds: “We don’t want to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard of ways.” (PI, 133) I take Wittgenstein to have made an observation about the nature of our language when he speaks of the unsurveyability of our grammar and thereby implicitly also of the entire human form of life. That our grammar is unsurveyable is due to the malleability and openness of language. There are, after all, “countless kind of use of all the things we call ‘signs’, ‘words’, ‘sentences’. And this diversity is not something fixed, given once and for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we say, come into existence and others become obsolete and get forgotten.” (PI, 23) Our language is not one thing, built on a single ground plan. It is like “a maze of little street and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses.” (PI, 18)[12]

I believe that these words tell us something about the limits of surveillance. Such a limit is not set by there being an unbreakable code, nor does it result from our ability to limit the circle of those to whom we speak, and it is also not due to our private sensations and thoughts being absolutely inaccessible to others. The limit of surveillance lies in our capacity to think and speak in new, unanticipated ways. This is not a merely speculative remark but one with immediate practical applications. Those who wo want to protect the privacy of their digital phones find it necessary to change them frequently to avoid an infection with malware.  Those who need the privacy of their internet communications will regularly change their addresses and servers. Those who speak and write in public will find it necessary to change the words they use and the ways they express themselves. We can learn here something the Chinese intellectuals on the Canadian website. They are often able to write in a surprisingly open and critical manner about the political, social, and intellectual realities of contemporary China. But they know, of course that they are under observation and that they need to tread carefully. They need to reconcile a number of different motivation. They are, of course, motivated first of all to communicate their own thinking. But they will at the same time want to express their thoughts in ways that escape the censor and do not provoke prosecution. They will also be concerned to keep private what they fear may get them into trouble with the authorities. Though they may also want to give others hints of those unexpressed thoughts. They are forced to become like foxes, outrunning the slow-moving hedgehogs of surveillance and censorship that seek to keep track of us with their cumbersome algorithms and rigid rules.

To be private does not mean to be confined in an inaccessible space. Privacy can also be found in the open where it is least expected. It is there where the agents of control cannot discriminate it. It is where the wind keeps shifting directions and contours keep changing. “Where do you hide a grain of sand?” G.K. Chesterton once asked. The answer, he thought, was: “On the Beach.”

Notes

[1] David Ownby, “Am I Being Played?” Reading the China Dream, February 15, 2021, https://www.readingthechinadream.com/david-ownby-am-i-being-played.html

[2] Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, Harper & Row, New York 1960, pp. 55 and 43.

[3] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, P. M’ S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester 2000, 246. All subsequent references to this text marked as “PI” with the appropriate section or page number.

[4]  “China set to pass new law to protect ‘legitimate rights’ on personal data,” South China Morning Post, August 17, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3145390/china-set-pass-new-law-protect-legitimate-rights-personal-data

[5] Shoshana Zuboff, “The Secrets of Surveillance Capitalism,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 5, 2016.

[6] Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago U. P., Chicago 1958, Part 2 “The Public and the Private Realm.”

[7] Jessica Battke and Mareike Ohlberg, “The State of Surveillance. Government Documents Reveal New Evidence on China’s Efforts to Monitor Its People,” China File, October 30, 2020, https://www.chinafile.com/state-surveillance-china.

 

[8] “From ‘rice bunny’ to ‘back up the car’: China’s year of censorship, The Guardian, Dec. 30, 2018 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/31/from-rice-bunny-to-back-up-the-car-chinas-year-of-censorship.

[9] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Credit_System#:~:text=The%20Social%20Credit%20System%20%28%20Chinese%3A%20%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E4%BF%A1%E7%94%A8%E4%BD%93%E7%B3%BB%3B%20pinyin%3A,Communist%20Party%20of%20China%20Xi%20Jinping%20%27s%20administration.

[10] Battke and Ohlberg, loc. cit.

[11] Hans Sluga, Politics and the Search for the Common Good, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 2014, chapter 8.

[12] Hans Sluga, “Our grammar lacks surveyability,” in Language and World. Part One. Essays on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, ontos verlag, Frankfurt 2010.

 

Wittgenstein’s Transitions

 

 

 

 “In this work more than in any other it is worth looking at apparently solved questions again and again from new sides as unsolved,“ Ludwig Wittgenstein jotted in his philosophical notebook in November of 1914. “Don’t get stuck with what you once wrote. Think always of a fresh beginning, as if nothing had as yet happened.” (p. 30) [1] The First World War had been raging for months; Wittgenstein was serving as an outlook on an Austrian gunboat; but he remained determined to continue the philosophical work he had been doing before the war with Bertrand Russell at Cambridge. “Logic must take care of itself,” had been the opening entry in his new notebook on August 22. He called it “a singularly profound and significant insight.” (p. 2) The sentence was intended to say, first of all, that logic is self-contained, that it does not rest on anything outside it. But by putting it at the head of his notebook Wittgenstein may also have been expressing the hope that his work in logic would not be affected by the vagaries of the war. “Will I be able to work now?” he had asked himself anxiously on the first page of the private diary he attached to his philosophical notebook.[2] It turned out that he could do so even under heavy bombardment. “Canons shook the boat as they fired near us at night. Worked much and with success,” he wrote on December 6.[3] But progress was often slow and he feared that “the redeeming word has not been spoken.”[4] As long as that was the case, he could only go over the same ground again and again. His most vexing problem at the time was that of “the logical form of the proposition,” a topic he had been exploring with Russell in the preceding years. But his view on the topic was still far from settled. “Does the subject-predicate form exist,” he now asked himself. “Does the relational form exist? Do any of the forms exist at all that Russell and I were always talking about?” (pp. 2-3)  And so it went with questions but no definitive answers.

Some fifteen years later, Friedrich Waismann was trying to pin down Wittgenstein’s thinking for an expository book he was hoping to write.  Wittgenstein had by then achieved some fame with his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, composed as the war was ending and published in 1921 with Russell’s effusive introduction. Back in Austria, the scholars in the Vienna Circle treated the work as a revelation. But their attempts to get its author to explain the book to them met with little success; Waismann’s discussions with Wittgenstein proved equally frustrating. “He has the wonderful gift of always seeing things as if for the first time,” Waismann noted. “He always follows the inspiration of the moment and tears down what he has previously sketched out.”[5] After ten years of almost complete philosophical silence, Wittgenstein’s thinking had just entered a newly volatile phase. In 1930 he returned to Cambridge to sort out what he now thought to be missing in his earlier work. He began to lecture on the themes of the Tractatus, but the book struck him now increasingly as a piece of unbearable dogmatism. That conclusion sparked new investigations which led him on an exhausting journey, ”criss-cross over a wide field of thought,” in which “the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions and new sketches made,” as he wrote later in the preface to his Philosophical Investigations. Many of these sketches, he added, “were badly drawn or lacking in character, marked by all the defects of a weak draughtsman. And when they were rejected, a number of half-way decent ones were left, which then had to be arranged.”[6] This is how the new book was composed. It was a collection of remarks, no more than “an album.”

Wittgenstein never quite finished his Philosophical Investigations. Its initial parts were firm enough in his mind, but he was unsure about how to complete the book. In 1948 he began to look at the issues once again in new ways. At the end, he confided to yet another notebook: “I do philosophy now like an old woman who is always mislaying something and having to look for it again: now her spectacles, now her keys.”[7]

There emerges from all this the picture of a restless thinker set on constantly revisiting and reworking what he has previously thought. Waismann who had initially heard of Wittgenstein as the author of the Tractatus had expected a very different person. The book consisted of apodictic statements put forth with a minimal amount of argument and formulated in an often hieratic style. Its aura of absolute certainty was reenforced, moreover, by the elaborate numbering of its propositions that Wittgenstein had adopted from Principia Mathematica, Russell and Whitehead’s majestic logical treatise. The Tractatus presented itself thus to the unwary reader as a work of a stern, logical order and the author as someone endowed with unconditional truths.

That was, however, a piece of fiction. The book was, in fact, largely composed by extracting diverse propositions from earlier writings and each one of them had originally been surrounded by doubts and questions. Some of those propositions came from notes Wittgenstein had compiled for Russell in 1913; many others were taken from the philosophical notebooks he kept during the First World War. The Tractatus was, in this respect, just like Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, more of “an album” of sketches made on an extended intellectual journey than a tightly constructed treatise. We can see this clearly when we turn from the book to the source of its propositions in the war-time notebooks. Though not all of them have survived, the three notebooks that have permit us to reconstruct much of Wittgenstein’s course of thinking from the beginning of the First World War to January 1917. What we find in them is the record of an intricate back and forth in his thinking on a wide range of philosophical topics. They document continuous small shifts as well as some major turns in Wittgenstein’s thinking and in the end the emergence of a radically new way of conceiving philosophy. The Tractatus was a record of this entire development. Taking note of the long, treacherous journey that led to its composition is, in fact, indispensable for understanding its highly condensed formulations and for recognizing their varied and unstable subsoil.

The journey recorded in Wittgenstein’s war-time notebooks begins with questions provoked by Russell’s logical atomism. Russell had come to that doctrine in the late 1890s as a result of his break with F. H. Bradley’s monistic idealism.  His friend G. E. Moore had led the way in an 1899 essay on “The Nature of Judgment.” With the help of a somewhat rudimentary logic Moore had sought to establish that reality was not a single thing – Bradley’s “One” – but  consisted of a multitude of concepts.[8] This so-called turn to realism was thus, in effect, one to a metaphysical pluralism. Russell readily adopted Moore’s pluralistic view and found support for it in the philosophy of Leibniz.[9] His view was, as he later put it, “that you can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples out of which the world is built, and that those simples have a kind of reality not belonging to anything else.”[10] But he remained quite uncertain about the nature of those simples. Were they concepts and judgments, as Moore had maintained? Were they particulars or universals or, perhaps, both? Could they be spatial points or even sense data? When Wittgenstein arrived in Cambridge in 1911, he found Russell at work on a theory of knowledge that was to settle the issue. Russell’s tool for achieving that end was the logic he had devised in the previous years and, in particular, his theory of descriptions which seemed to allow one to distinguish between merely apparent objects that could be analyzed away and objects resistant to further analysis.

While Wittgenstein’s war-time notebooks show him deeply immersed, from the first page,  in the problems of logical atomism it wasn’t, however, this doctrine that had initially brought him to work with Russell. When Wittgenstein got to Cambridge in 1911, he was mostly familiar with Russell’s 1903 book The Principles of Mathematics. As a result he had visited Gottlob Frege in Jena, whose logical theories Russell had discussed in a long appendix, and Frege had advised him to go to Cambridge to study with Russell; he had also become fascinated with Russell’s discussion of the logical paradoxes in a second appendix to his book and had written short piece on that topic. He was thus initially primed to focus on Russell’s logic and convinced that he could make a contribution to its further development. “Logic is still in the melting pot,” he wrote brazenly to his mentor in 1912 within a year of having embarked on that project. He was sure that it “must turn out to be a totally different kind than any other science.”[11] Russell, who had spent years of excruciating work on his logic, seems to have taken the remark in good spirits. But, as far as Wittgenstein was concerned, that logic still lacked sufficient unity and simplicity. In logic, he wrote later on in the Tractatus, simplicity was a sign of correctness. In June 1913, he informed Russell accordingly of some ideas he had in this respect: “One of the consequences of my ideas will – I think – be that the whole of logic follows from one proposition only.”[12] His efforts to improve on Russell’s logic took form in two early writings: a set of dense notes written for Russell in 1913 and another set of equally dense remarks dictated to G. E. Moore a year later.[13] Fundamental in them was the distinction between propositions and proper names. “Frege said ‘propositions are names’, Russell said ‘ proposiitons correspond to complexes’. Both are false; and especially false is the statement ‘propositions are names of complexes’,” he wrote in the first set of notes. (p.97) The distinctive characteristic of propositions was that they had two poles of in that they could be either true or false. This bi-polarity of the proposition he expected to be one of the unifying principles of his logic. It justified truth-functional logic, it suggested a diagrammatic representation of their relations, and eventually their depiction in a system of truth-tables. But that still left the logic of generalized propositions unexplained and Wittgenstein found himself wrestling with that topc.  In addition there was also still the need to solve the logical paradoxes with helps of a theory of types whose justification was, however, again a problem. Wittgenstein’s notes for Russell and Moore were suggestive, but they did not make a conclusive case for a newly unified and simplified science of logic..

Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with these technical problems, however, made Russell anxious that his student would remain a narrow specialist, lacking an understanding of the broader and deeper philosophical issues with which Russell saw himself concerned. That was, however, a misjudgment. At the end of his notes for Russell, Wittgenstein had sought to to soothe Russell’s anxieties by announcing that “philosophy consists of logic and metaphysics. Logic is its base.” (p. 106) So, metaphysics was after all the goal of Wittgenstein’s project. But he added at this point three other propositions that must have given Russell some pause. “In philosophy there are no deductions; its is purely descriptive. Philosophy gives no picture of reality. Philosophy can neither confirm nor confute scientific investigation.” (p. 106) These posed, in effect, a direct challenge to Russell whose logical atomism was meant precisely to give a deductive and scientific picture of reality. It is far from clear how Wittgenstein himself thought of ho those claims were to be reconciled with his belief that philosophy consisted of logic and metaphysics. He held consistently that philosophy was not a science and in this respect he was certainly at odds with Russell and that proposition was not necessarily incompatible with saying philosophy was made up of logic and metaphysics. But the two other propositions were more of a challenge. How could philosophy be purely descriptive and how could it not give a picture of reality while being at the same time a metaphysics?  As it turned out, Wittgenstein was not to make anything more of these pronouncements till later. It was only in the 1930’s when the Tractatus system had broken down that he came back to the idea of philosophy as a purely descriptive undertaking. And that philosopher might not be able to provide a picture of reality became clear to him only in the course of his war-time reflections. It entered from there into the Tractatus and became one of Wittgenstein’s leading ideas in the 1930s.

Two things are, in any case, clear from Wittgenstein’s notes for Russell. The first is that already in 1913 Wittgenstein subscribed to a broader philosophical agenda than Russell realized and the second is that this agenda remained undeveloped until he turned to Russell’s logical atomism. That his wartime notebooks begin with than examination of key issues of logical atomism signals, thus, one of those transitions in Wittgenstein’s thinking that were to become definitive of his philosophical life. But it is not difficult to understand why he embarked at this point on the exploration of logical atomism. Atomism has proved an attractive position in the history of philosophy. Democritus and Leucippus were inspired by it and they invented the word “atom for the assumed simple elements.  Plato sketched a version of it in the Theaetetus. Leibniz became its most prominent exponent in modern philosophy and even today it lives a ghostly life in what we call model theory. Wittgenstein himself had, however, grown up with other, more holistic forms of thinking and so Russell’s atomism must have come to him as an appealing and liberating alternative.

His war-time notebooks indicate that he initially identified with much of the program of Russell’s atomism though by no means to all of its details.  He never bought into his mentor’s entire philosophy and certainly not into his social and political opinions. His philosophical discussions with Russell were often stormy. In the notes he wrote for his mentor in 1913, he highlighted various disagreements and laid out how he meant to go beyond Russell’s work.  The war-time notebooks continue that independent line of thinking. From the start, Wittgenstein objects to Russell’s appeal to self-evidence in order to settle questions about logical structure and the nature of the simple objects. “Russell would say ‘Yes! That’s self-evident,’” he wries, but Wittgenstein considers this ridiculous. (p. 3)  Russell had, in fact, devoted a whole chapter of his Theory of Knowledge to defend his reliance on self-evidence, but for Wittgenstein the idea of self-evidence “is and always was whole deceptive.” (p. 4) Such disagreements did not mean that Wittgenstein rejected logical atomism altogether. But the doctrine needed sifting and clarification. In contrast to Russell – and, in fact, in contrast to all the earlier atomists – Wittgenstein recognized the profound challenges the doctrine raises. The most difficult one was, perhaps, how the doctrine could be justified. It could, obviously, not be deduced from observation since that would never deliver “ultimate constituents.” Some kind of analysis was called for and that analysis had to use some kind of logic. That raised, however, immediately two set of questions. The first concerned the logic to be used in the process of analysis, and the other the outcome of the analysis, the determination of the sought-after simples. Wittgenstein’s notebooks show him to be working tenaciously and for months on these interconnected issues.

As for the logic, Wittgenstein asked himself at the start of his notebooks what logical structures the process of analysis could discover. Hence, his preoccupation with the question of the logical form of propositions. How could one be sure that one had given the right analysis? And how could one determine that the analysis was complete? Wittgenstein struggled hard over these questions. There were seemingly insurmountable difficulties with negative propositions and likewise with the generalized ones. The notebooks contain, in consequence, repeated reminders such as: “In all these considerations I am somewhere making some sort of FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE.” (p. 10) Russell had naively assumed that one could read the structure of reality off from the logical form of our propositions.  But he had no satisfactory account of how this was to be done. In his Theory of Knowledge he had said only that the proposition “A is similar to B” is true “when there is a complex composed of A and B and similarity.”[14] Wittgenstein had at first agreed with this, writing in his 1913 notes: “The form of a proposition has meaning in the following way… I say that if an x stands in the relation R to a y the sign ‘xRy’ is to be called true to the fact and otherwise false. This is a definition of sense.” (p. 91) But that was certainly no definition. Both Russell and Wittgenstein were considering  only particular relational propositions. They soon moved on, however, to a more considered view, if we can trust the lectures on the philosophy of logical atomism Russell delivered in 1918. According to Russell, those lectures reflected the state of their joint thinking at the moment the war broke out and Wittgenstein was forced to return to Austria. Their view was, in Russell’s words, that “in a logically correct symbolism there will always be a certain fundamental identity of structure between a fact and the symbol for it …and the complexity of the symbol corresponds very closely with the complexity of the facts symbolized by it .”[15] But this was not yet enough in Wittgenstein’s eyes. Early on in his war-time notebook he still expresses uncertainty over “the logical identity of sign and signified.” (p. 3) We must, perhaps, think of a proposition as a model in which “a world is as it were put together experimentally.” Or, better still, we must think of it as a picture. (p. 7) But was that satisfactory? “On the one hand my theory of logical depiction seems to be the only possible one, on the other there seems to be an insoluble contradiction in it.” (p. 17) It is not obvious what contradiction Wittgenstein has in mind. It seems to have involved generalized propositions. His dissatisfaction with the “theory of logical depiction” is, any case, evident. One of its problems is that there are different ways or methods of representation.  And: “The method of depiction must be completely determinate before we can at all compare reality with the proposition to see whether it is true or false.” (p. 25) That answer created, however, problems of its own. Would one not have to be able to identify both the structure of the proposition and that of the fact in order to see whether they were one and the same? The logical atomists assumed, however, that one could read the structure of reality off from that of the fully analyzed proposition. That was the whole strategy of their position. But what would guarantee that the structure of the proposition was a clue to that of the facts? .

Considerations of this kind led Wittgenstein, in turn, to ones concerning the supposed elements of reality. Like Russell, he kept going back and forth over the possibilities. Were they sense-date? Could they be universals? Were they spatial points?And so on. In the end he came to ask himself whether logic could even tell us in principle what they were. Perhaps it could assure us only that there were such but without identifying the atoms themselves. He was certainly ready to assume that “the world has a fixed structure.” (p. 62) This was equivalent, he thought, to saying that our words must have definite sense since “the demand for simple things is the demand for definiteness of sense.” (p. 60) One could then conclude that there were ultimate constituents of reality, “simple objects,” without having to specify their exact nature. “It seems that the idea of the simple is already to be found contained in that of the complex and in the idea of analysis, and in such a way that we come to the idea quite apart from any examples of simple objects, or of propositions which mention them, and we realize the existence of the simple object – a priori – as a logical necessity.” (p.62) But was it obvious that the analysis would lead to simple, unanalyzable elements? Was that already contained in the concept of analysis? Or could the analysis go on ad infinitum? Perhaps, one could even speak of simple constituents. Wittgenstein was willing to put particular weight on the transcendental argument that Leibniz had used in his Monadology to argue for the existence of simples. There had to be simples because there were complexes.[16] Had Wittgenstein been inspired by Russell’s book to adopt this Leibnizian line of reasoning? Or had he read Leibniz on his own? There are certainly surprising similarities between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the Monadology even though the simples they speak of are quite different. What unites the two writings is their logical starting-point, their contraposition of will and representation, the denial of causal relations, and most of all the course of their reasoning from metaphysical foundations to the questions of ethics, not to speak of the numbering of their propositions. It is useful to remind ourselves here that Wittgenstein drew not only on Frege and Russell for philosophical inspiration. From the private war-time diaries we learn that he was also reading Tolstoy, Emerson, and Nietzsche at the same time as he was laboring over Frege’s and Russell’s ideas. Traces of all these influences are, in fact, noticeable at some point in his notebooks.

His attachment to Russell was to weaken as the war went on. Nine months into the conflict, Wittgenstein’s notebook records a first rupture with Russell’s way of thinking and an indication that a major transition in Wittgenstein’s thinking is on the way. The passage in question occurs in the middle of extensive reflections on the simple constituents of reality. On May 23, 1915, Wittgenstein writes in a tone quite alien to anything he had written before in his notebook: “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. There really is only one world soul, which I for preference call my soul and as which alone I conceive what I call the souls of others.” This, he adds, provides the key for deciding “in how far solipsism is a truth.” (p. 49) In the same tone he continues two days later: “The urge towards the mystical comes from the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science. We feel that even if all possible scientific questions are answered our problem is still not touched at all.” (p. 51) None of those words had been prepared by anything earlier in his notebooks. The limits of language and the world, the stress on “my language,” the conception of a world soul, solipsism, the limits of science, the non-scientific character of “our problems,” the mystical — none of those themes had been addressed in the earlier pages. All of them were, moreover, entirely foreign to Russell and his mode of thinking. In his Introduction to the Tractatus, Russell would later dismiss such speculative thoughts with the words: “Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said.”[17] His caustic remark provoked Wittgenstein, in turn, to accuse Russell of not having understood his book. May 23, 1915 marks thus a first major break-with Russell and his way of doing philosophy even though its full implications may not have been obvious to Wittgenstein at the time since he turns immediately back from his speculative remarks to further reflections on the nature of the simple objects – almost, as if nothing had happened. But those few sentences mark, nonetheless, a first step away from Russell and his program and, as it turns out, also from Russell’s understanding of philosophy itself.

From where, then, did these strange new thoughts come? What motivated their intrusion into Wittgenstein’s apparently straightforward attempt to sort out the problems of logical atomism? We don’t know exactly what occasioned them. Was there an external motivation for them? Wittgenstein’s first sentence on May 23 may, in fact, be read as continuing his preceding discussion of simple objects but In a new register suggesting that we have no language-independent means of establishing what is simple. Some such thought had, indeed, already occurred to him two weeks earlier: “The simple thing for us is: the simplest thing that we know – the simplest thing to which our analysis can advance – it need appear only as a prototype, as a variable in our propositions.” (p. 47) Even so, the new emphasis on language being “my language” introduces an element of the subjective into Wittgenstein’s thinking that had not been visibly there before and that has no equivalent in Russell’s philosophy. Wittgenstein’s turn against Russell becomes even more evident in the next two sentences with their talk of solipsism and the world soul, themes onc again alien to Russell. And, if this is not enough, his subsequent appeal to the mystical and his insistence that there are “personal” problems that cannot be resolved scientifically are clearly meant to draw a line between his own view and Russell’s scientistic outlook.

Though none of these reservations had made an appearance before in his notebook, Wittgenstein was also not making them up on the spot. He was not just relying here on momentary inspiration. His turn against Russell signaled, rather, a return to another, earlier set of ideas that had become submerged when he went to Cambridge and had aligned himself there with Russell’s program. Those earlier ideas had come to Wittgenstein largely from Arthur Schopenhauer’s book The World as Will and Representation. Georg Henrik von Wright recalled later that Wittgenstein had told him once that “his first philosophy was a Schopenhauerian epistemological idealism.”[18] This is not implausible since Schopenhauer’s book had been immensely a popular in Fin de Siècle Vienna. Its pronounced pessimism and implied skepticism fitted the mood of the Austro-Hungarian empire in decline. From Ludwig Boltzmann to Sigmund Freud and from Fritz Mauthner to Otto Weininger, the Viennese authors with whom Wittgenstein was familiar, had all been affected by Schopenhauer’s philosophy. But we have to assume that by the time he arrived in Cambridge Wittgenstein had abandoned (or was about to abandon) this early excursion into philosophy. He may have been drawn to Russell’s atomism, in fact, precisely because it provided an antidote to the overwhelming cultural influence of Schopenhauer’s view of the world as unindividuated metaphysical will. But it would be mistaken to think that the association with Russell completely extinguished Wittgenstein’s interest in Schopenhauer.  The later parts of his war-time notebooks and the Tractatus itself show how much Schopenhauer was still very much on his mind. He appears to have remained particularly attracted Schopenhauer’s heterodox views on ethics which rejected moral rules and, in particular Kant’s categorical imperative, and described ethics as a way of seeing the world rather than of acting in it. Wittgenstein’s notebooks and the Tractatus also draw on   Schopenhauer’s reflections on the will and, not least, on his philosophy of art.  Most striking is perhaps that the beginning and end of the Tractatus mimic the first and last sentence of Schopenhauer’s book.

Just as significant as the presence of Schopenhauer in the notebook passage from May 23 is that of Fritz Mauthner, the author of three expansive volumes of Contributions to a Critique of Language. The work argued for “a critique of language which would be a meta-critique of reason” in a phrase Mauthner had borrowed from Fritz Jacobi, the friend of Immanuel Kant, who had taken the idea in turn from the dark musings of Johann Georg Hamann. Wittgenstein had certainly read the first volume of Mauthner’ book by the beginning of the war and would later familiarize himself with Hamann’s writings.[19] He was interested, thus, in ways of thinking about language that were distinct from what he had learned from Frege and Russell. It was Mauthner who impressed on him the idea that what we abstractly call “language” is  in reality always “my language.” It was Mauthner also who had discussed solipsism and the world soul in his magnum opus.. Wittgenstein’s notebook entry of May 23 marks thus a tur and return not only to Schopenhauer but also to Mauthner. And this return to Mauthner was potentially most devastating for his attachment to Russell’s atomism For it would lead Wittgenstein in the later parts of his notebooks to adopt Mauthner’s skepticism about all philosophical theorizing. It was this “pyrrhonian” Mauthner who supplied him with his concluding metaphor in the Tractatus of the ladder one must throw away after one has climbed up on it. Even so, Wittgenstein’s adoption of Mauthner’s views had been selective. In the  Tractatus he was still sufficiently in the thrall of Russell’s logic to conclude that critique of language could not be conducted “in Mauthner’s sense” by remaining within the confines of ordinary language.[20] At that point Wittgenstein had still faith in Russell’s distinction between the apparent and the real logical form of the proposition. It was only after he had abandoned the Tractatus that he discovered the whole force of Mauthner’s meta-critique of reason by means of a critique of language.

Perplexing as Wittgenstein turn and return to Schopenhauer and Mauthner on May 23 proves to be, just as perplexing is the abrupt way the excursion ends. Within two days, we find him back at the pains-taking task of trying to determine the identity of the simples of atomist lore. It was as if nothing had happened. But how solid was his apparent recommitment to the atomist program? Where was he moving to at this point? We have unfortunately no record of the course of Wittgenstein’s thinking between June 2015 and April 2016 since the notes covering that period are now lost. But it is clear from the following notebook that a year later he has not yet given up on logical atomism. That notebook begins with further reflections on simple objects and the form of the proposition.  But his words echo now what he had said the previous year about the subjective character of our thinking about them. On April 15 he writes: “We can foresee only what we ourselves construct. But then where is the concept of the simple object still to be found?” (p. 71) Since simple objects are not immediately accessible to us, our claim that there are such comes to being a prediction that logical analysis will ultimately deliver them. But if we can foresee only what we ourselves construct then our account of the simple objects will depend on our construction. He goes on to speak similarly of the construction of simple functions and since such functions determine the form of the propositions in which they occur, it now appears that the forms of propositions we can identify must also be relative to what we are able to construct. The realistic picture of logical atomism seems to have given way here to a constructivist one. But the issue is not yet completely settled. A year earlier he had already entertained the possibility that one might need to distinguish between what is simple for us and what is simple absolutely speaking. Could it not even be the case that when we speak of an ordinary object, such as the watch on the table, we treat it, in effect, as logically simple? Even so, there may still be absolute simples in addition.  What if our construction is somehow determined by what is out there? In that case, it may still be possible to give a definite and “objective” answer to the question of the simple objects and the logical forms of the proposition. Towards the end of the notebook, on Nov. 11, Wittgenstein gets back to this point once more when he writes that it must be possible “to set up the general form of the proposition, because the possible forms of propositions must be a priori.” (p. 89)

All the same, his notes indicate also a growing distance to Russell’s version of logical atomism. That becomes dramatically apparent in the spring of 1916. The episode begins on May 6 with Wittgenstein addressing once more the theme of the limits of science. “The whole world view of the moderns is grounded in this illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of the natural phenomena. We thus stop with the “laws of nature” as something inviolable just as the ancients did with God and fate.  And both are right and wrong. The old ones are, however, clearer in that they acknowledge a clear endpoint, whereas it appears in the new system, as if everything was grounded.” (p. 72) This renewed critique of scientism expresses at once reservations about Russell’s world view and fresh attention to Schopenhauer and Mauthner who both question the explanatory power of science. There follows a short passage on logical operations followed by a hiatus of three weeks in which Wittgenstein remains silent. When he resumes his notebook entries on June 11 we are faced with the unexpected question: “What do I know about God and the purpose of life?” (p. 72) The two topics prove to be intimately linked for him. “To believe in God means that life has a sense,” he writes shortly later. (p. 74) We can, in fact, call the meaning of life by the name of God. We can also identify God with fate and even with the world. Prayer he says is “thinking of the meaning of life.”  The question about God and the purpose of life initiates a whole series of further thoughts on the world and our place in it, on good and evil, and the nature of the will.  As he pursues these themes still other topics make their appearance: the human self, idealism and solipsism, ethics and art, happiness, death and suicide. The tightly argued examination of logical atomism in the earlier pages of his notebooks has exploded into a wild array of bewildering new thoughts. “Yes,” he writes, “my work has expanded from the foundations of logic to the essence of the world.” (p. 79)

In contrast to the previous moment in May 1915 when he had turned away from the problems of logical atomism only to return to them shortly afterwards, these new reflections continue for several months interspersed with only occasional glances back at his previous concerns with the atomist program. Finally, on November 21, the current of speculative thought appears to be running dry and we find Wittgenstein fretting once more over the question of the general form of the proposition. While we can’t say what had occasioned the disruption of his train of thought in May 1915, we do know what triggered this one. On May 6, five days before Wittgenstein asks his disturbing question about God and the purpose of life, his private diary records that he feels in imminent danger of losing his life in the war. How can one find inner peace in this situation?  “Only by living in a way that pleases God. Only in this way is it possible to bear life.”[21] He adds on May 10: “I am doing well now due to the grace of God. … He will not abandon me in this danger.” On May 16: “I am sleeping today under infantry fire and will likely perish. God be with me. I surrender my soul to the Lord.” [22] Worse is still to come. In June, the Russians launch a major attack on the Austrian forces in the so-called “Brusilov offensive.” Thousands of Austrian soldiers lose their lives, many others become Russian prisoners of war. Wittgenstein’s own unit is directly engaged in this deadly battle which lasts till the middle of August. He is certain that he will not survive. On July 29 he writes: “I was shot at yesterday. Was scared. I was afraid of death. I have such a wish now to go on living. And it is difficult to renounce life…”[23]

His thoughts in this period are often feverish and obscure – as he realizes. “Here I am still making crude mistakes. No doubt about that.” he notes on July 29. (p. 78) “I am conscious of the complete unclarity of all these sentences.” (p. 79) They are driven by existential anxieties rather than logical ratiocination. Only some of them will make it into the Tractatus. His reflections on God do not, but those on the meaning of life will become essential for the coda of his book. The world” will also remain a topic of concern in it and that in two ways.  The world is all that is the case, as the first sentence of the book will say, and as such a matter of logic.. But ethics also demands that we see the world in the right way, as the end of the book will declare. “Ethics does not treat of the world,” he writes in his notebook. It is, rather, “the condition of the world, just like logic.” (p. 77) We don’t have to look far to find the inspiration for this dual picture. We can find it in Schopenhauer World as Will and Representation.

But what is the right way to look at the world? The question leads Wittgenstein to pose two others. What is the place of the subject, the I, the self in relation to the world? And where do we find good and evil? As to the first question, he says that what we call “the world” is really always only “my world.” Or as he puts it provocatively: “The world and life are one.” (p. 77) Death is therefore not an event or fact in the world. In death the world ceases to be. But what makes the world my world? What is the subject? Russell had talked of knowledge as based on a fundamental relation of acquaintance and of acquaintance as “a dual relation between a subject and an object.”[24]  But this subject, he had insisted, was not to be identified with an I or self. There was no need to assume a persistent self. Wittgenstein had never felt much attraction to Russell’s doctrine of acquaintance. His work was not meant to be epistemological in character. Epistemology is the philosophy of psychology,” he had written to Russell in 1913, and as such of minor interest. (p. 106) That was also something he also meant to convey in his programmatic statement that logic must take care of itself. In his notebook he rejects Russell’s conception of acquaintance out of hand. “The representing subject is surely mere illusion,” he writes. But: there is still the I or self to be considered as distinct from the Russellian subject. “The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious.” (p. 80) The I is mysterious because we never confront it as an object. I am in the world, he writes, in the way my eye is in my visual field. The perceiving eye is, in fact, not part of the visual field. It is what makes the visual field possible. In the same way the I is not part of the world but makes my world possible. It makes its appearance “through the world’s being my world.” (p. 80) This I is, however, not the individual self, but the “one world soul” of which he had said a year earlier that it manifests itself as that “which I for preference call my soul.” (p. 49) This subject or self it to be conceived will as he writes, once again in line with Schopenhauer. While the representing subject is a mere illusion, “the willing subject exists.” (p. 80) But the will must not be conceived as a causal power by which the individual can affect events in the world. For “the world is independent of my will.” (p. 73) Standing apart from the world, the will can only define an attitude to the world as a whole. It can lead us to reject or accept the world for what it is.

With this we have entered the domain of value or ethics and aesthetics. To accept the world for what it is means to be happy and happiness is what we should strive to attain. The happy life, is one lived in accord with the world. It is in this state that we grasp the meaning of life. “Is this not the reason why human beings to whom after many doubts the meaning of life has become clear, cannot then say in what that meaning consists.” (p. 74) The problems of life find their solution in their disappearance. Ethics is thus not concerned with advancing a theory; it does not assert propositions or promulgate rules. It is, in fact, clear that ”ethics cannot be expressed in words.” (p. 78) . Ethics, he says, is thus “transcendent” – or, rather, “transcendental,” as he will phrase it in the Tractatus. It is a way of seeing the world from outside as a whole sub specie aeternitatis. And this is, at the same time, the aesthetic way of seeing things. “The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis, and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between art and ethics.” (p.83) Ethics is the aesthetics of the world.

The claim that ethics cannot put into words puts Wittgenstein on the path to an even more radical conclusion. He had previously talked of logical limits to what can be said. What do I know when I understand a proposition but do not know whether it is true or false, he had asked himself in 1914.  And he had replied to that question: “At this point I am again trying to express something that cannot be expressed. (p. 31) That had been, in fact, yet another thought embedded in the first, introductory sentence of his war-time notebook. That logic must take care of itself meant among other things that “all we have to do [and, in fact, all we can do] is to look and see how it does it.” (p. 11) But Wittgenstein’s conclusion that ethics, too, cannot be put into words, adds a new dimension to those earlier considerations. Since logic and ethics form the arc on which Wittgenstein’s philosophical thinking in this period moves he is made to conclude: “The correct method would be to say nothing, except what can be said, i.e. what belongs to natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy.” (p. 94) And with this conclusion, the break with Russell has become complete. The entire project of logical atomism has been consigned now to what cannot be said and is therefore without sense. Wittgenstein’s thinking has broken through all the earlier layers in which it had been confined and confronts philosophy now in a new, profoundly different way. It will take him the rest of his life, though, to discover the consequences of this revelation.

But his thoughts in the summer and fall of 1916 were not yet the end of the road he had been traveling since the beginning of the war. The year before he had written to Russell: “I have recently done much work and, I believe, with good result. I am now busy bringing the whole thing together and writing it down in the form of a treatise.”[25] That treatise was still to be written a year later. Wittgenstein did not get around to that concluding task till the middle of 1918. The war-time notebooks in our possession end unfortunately in January of the preceding year. It is thus impossible for us to track the course of Wittgenstein’s thinking to the moment when he set to work on the text of the Tractatus. The assumption is that he completed at least one more notebook and possibly two before that he began work on his book.  It is plausible to think that whatever he wrote in that period was more or less like the earlier notebooks, that he continued to record individual thoughts on variety topics and put them down as they struck  him. Those lost notes may have covered much of the same ground as the notebooks we have and displayed the same kind of  back and forth in his thinking. There was, no doubt, also additional material in them. Some passages in the Tractatus have no precedents in the existing notebooks. One striking example is the discussion of mathematics in the Tractatus. Was that part of the book based on notes he made between the end of 1916 and the middle of 1918? We can be fairly certain, however, that he did noy sit down in this period two write a deductive treatise. All he had, when he finally began to write the Tractatus was a set of scattered notes from which he quickly excerpted his text.  That should, in fact, be evident from the look of the finished product.

When he started the composition of his book in the summer of 1918, Wittgenstein was on  a temporary leave from the war front. Time was short and he was determined to bring the work to an end. There was no other option for him than to draw on what he had written earlier. He relied for this purpose on all the notes he had made in the previous five years and selected from them what he found suitable. That was no easy task, since his thinking had changed so much in those years and in so many different directions. His ambition was, surely, to present the material as a single coherent whole. In putting it together and selecting from what he had, he must have sought to clarify and unify what he wanted to say. But how far did he succeed in this? How far could he have succeeded, given that his thinking had moved across such a wide arc from the foundations of logic, through Russell’s atomism, to Schopenhauer’s ethics and Mauthner’s critique of language.

In putting his material together, Wittgenstein sought to impose on it a semblance of order by arranging his propositions according to the numbering system he had borrowed from Principia Mathematica. There were the major proposition numbered 1 through 7. Others were given decimal figures to indicate their place in the text and their relations to each other. Proposition 1.1 was meant to be subsidiary to proposition 1 and proposition 1.11 to 1.1, and so on. Some propositions ended up with lengthy decimals to indicate their minor place in the whole, as, e. g., proposition 5.47321. The scheme was ingenious and the scholars have been busy trying to decipher its significance. But how seriously can one take it? Not all of the seven major propositions appear to be of equal weight. Proposition 6 provides a notation for truth-functions which appears to be a greatly more specific subject-matter than the ones he addresses in the other major propositions. The principle that “logic must take care of itself” has been relegated to number 5.473 even though Wittgenstein had declared it to be a singularly profound insight in his initial notebook entry and the proposition retained a fundamental significance. Russell’s distinction between the apparent form of a proposition and its real logical form on which so much in Wittgenstein’s own account of atomism depends is mentioned only in 4.0031. The claim that logical constant do not represent anything, which Wittgenstein himself characterizes a Grundgedanke, is stated only in 4.0312. Caution is thus in place. One must not be seduced by Wittgenstein’s numbers.

While the formal presentation, the sustained voice of certainty, and the rhetorical pull of the propositions suggest a unitary system of ideas, it is far from clear that Wittgenstein has succeeded in producing any such thing. Looked at from the perspective of his war-time notebooks, the text suggests rather a course of thinking that leads from an apparently self-evident logical atomism to the concluding call to overcome its propositions in order to see the world in the right way. We should the perhaps read the Tractatus despite its name not as a treatise but as the record of a philosophical journey that Wittgenstein has undertaken in the previous years. Interpreters tend to look at philosophical texts in another way. They operate on a principle of charity which assumes that a philosophical text must be advancing a a coherent theory. In the face of obvious difficulties in applying that principle they often struggle in their attempts to find the expected theoretical lesson. The readers of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus have often done so by focusing only on part or another of the text. Some have taken it to be a straightforward contribution to the philosophy of logical atomism; others have considered it to be of piece of logic and a theory of meaning. For yet another group of interpreters the Tractatus is a lesson in philosophical skepticism. There are finally those for whom it is an essay on ethics. Each one of those interpretations has to ignore, reject, or downplay parts of the text. The Tractatus is, in fact, all and none of what the interpreters have made of it. It is an exercise in philosophical thinking that takes one over uncharted territories and produces a map that can be confusing. It exemplifies what philosophy is like when once one has crossed such territories and tried to decipher their maps. Wittgenstein’s hope in the Tractatus was that after this exercise one might be able to leave philosophy alone. Philosophy is “not a doctrine but a practice. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.”[26] At the time, Wittgenstein thought that one would have to give such elucidations only once and could thus be done with the work of philosophy. That was an error as he came ultimately to see.

When he spoke to members of the Vienna Circle in 1929 Wittgenstein appeared once again to be drawn to the question how to understand atomism. He still wanted to think of  propositions as pictures of states of affairs, but he allowed now that they might turn out to be  “incomplete pictures” that represented only some features of what they depicted. An identity of sign and signified was thus not required. The form of the elementary proposition could, moreover, not be determined once and for all by logic. It could be determined only in an empirical fashion. “It is simply ridiculous to believe that we can do here with the usual forms of ordinary language, with subject-predicate, with two-place relations, and so on.”[27] Objects were simply “equivalent elements of the representation;” they might be represented, for instance, by the equations of physics.

But after his return to Cambridge, there was no more talk of simple objects. G. E. Moore attended his lectures in this period and kept copious notes of them but in none of them did Wittgenstein contemplate such simples. Instead, he said now that both he and Russell had been confused about what logical analysis could deliver, “thinking that further work at logic would show us the elements…. Russell had no right to say that the result of analysis would be 2-term, 3-term relations, etc. … I was wrong in supposing that it had any sense to talk of [the] result of [a] final analysis.”[28]  They had both been misled by relying on an idea of analysis derived from natural science. “To analyze water is to find out something new about water… In philosophy we know all we need to know at the start, we don’t need to know any new facts.”[29]

That doesn’t mean that he had given up altogether on the pluralism that had been integral to the atomistic view-point. But his pluralistic outlook took now a different form. How many kinds of sentences are there, he asked in his Philosophical Investigations. “There are countless kinds, countless different kinds of use of all the things we call ‘sign’, ‘words’, sentences’.” [30] There were numerous kinds of language-games. There were multiple world views, he said in his late notes, each with its own internal logic. And there were even multiple kinds of mathematics. Russell’s atomism, it appears, had cured him once and for all of a hankering for an ultimate unity of things.

But his own reflections on logical atomism had also cured him of the wish to look for a single, unifying philosophical theory. Looking back at the Tractatus in 1932, he told his students: “Philosophical trouble is essentially this: You seem to see a system, yet [the] facts don’t seem to fit it; & you don’t know which to give up. Near it looks like a stump., then like a man. Then again…” His experience with the atomist program made him give up on the traditional understanding of philosophy as aiming at the construction of a theory. He now thought that this kind of theorizing was due to philosophers being blinded by the method of science which had tempted them “to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.”[31] That sort of  philosophizing he now considered to be dead and what was left of it was dispersed in different places. His own work concerned only some of what remained. ”One might say that the subject we are dealing with is one of the heirs of the subject which used to be called ‘philosophy’.”[32] In a daring metaphor he suggested that the only kind of philosophy that was now possible was like arranging books on a bookshelf. The goal was to achieve a transparent order but there was no ideal, absolute, final arrangement. He tried several formulas for characterizing the task of this new philosophizing. Philosophy, he said, was purely descriptive. Its goal was to describe the different ways we speak and think. It was phenomenological in trying to present a perspicuous overview of our grammar. It was therapeutic somewhat in the way Freud’s psychoanalysis was, relieving us of our perplexities. It was meant to liberate us from ways of thinking that  entrapped our minds like flies in a fly-bottle. Philosophy was, in fact, a continuous battle against the bewitchment of our mind by language We were bound to find ourselves again and again not knowing our way about. There could be no end to these entanglements. We were bound to remain in transition.

 

 

Notes

[1] Page references are to Ludwig Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916, edited by G.H. von Wright and G.E.M Anscombe; 2nd edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979. Translations modified (Text also referred to hereafter as NB)

[2] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Geheime Tagebücher 1914-1916, edited by Wilhelm Baum, Turia & Kant, Vienna 1991, p. 13. (Hereafter referred to as GT)

[3] GT, p. 49.

[4] GT, p. 45.

[5] Brian McGuinness, “Vorwort,” in Friedrich Waismann: Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, edited by B. F. McGuinness, Basic Blackwell, Oxford 1967, p. 26.

[6] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester 2009, p. 3.

[7] Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, Harper & Row, New York 1972, p. 70.

[8] G. E. Moore, “The Nature of Judgment,” Mind, vol. 8, 1899, p. 182: “It seems necessary then to regard the world as formed of concepts.”

[9] Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 1900

[10] Bertrand Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” in Russell, Logic and Knowledge. Essays 1901-1950, edited by Robert Charles Marsh, George Allen & Unwin, London 1956, p. 270.

[11] Letter to Russell of June 12, 1912, NB, p. 120.

[12] Letter to Russell of October 30 1913, NB, p. 123.

[13] Published as appendix I and II in NB.

[14] Bertrand Russell, Theory of Knowledge. The 1913 Manuscript, edited by Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, Routledge, New York and London 1992, p. 149.

[15] Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomismn,” p. 275.

[16] Leibniz, Monadology 1-3.

[17] Bertrand Russell, „Introduction,“ in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1922, p. 22

[18] Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir with a biographical sketch by Georg Henrik von Wright, Oxford U. P., London 1962,  p. 5.

[19] Alexander Stern, The Fall of Language: Benjamin and Wittgenstein on Meaning, Harvard U. P. Cambridge Mass. 2019.

[20] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 40031.

[21] GT, p. 70.

[22] GT, p. 71.

[23] GT, p. 74.

[24] Russell, Theory of Knowledge, p. 5.

[25] Georg Henrik von Wright, “The Origin of the Tractatus,” in v. Wright, Wittgenstein, Blackwell, Oxford 1982, p. 70

[26] Tractatus, 4.112.

[27] Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, p. 42.

[28] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1933. From the Notes of G. E. Moore, edited by David G. Stern, Brian Rogers, and Gabriel Citron, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 2016, p. 253

[29] Lectures, Cambridge 1930-1933, p. 88.

[30] Philosophical Investigations, 23

[31] Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books, Harper & Row, New York 1960,  p. 18.

[32] The Blue and Brown Books, p. 28.

Michel Foucault a pedophile?

The sordid story is going around that Foucault sodomized little boys in Moslem graveyards while he was teaching at the University of Tunis in the late 1960’s. It is due to a certain Guy Sorman who describes himself as a “leading French intellectual” but is in reality a self-promoting right-wing hack who has spent his career lauding the miracle of unrestrained capitalism. Sorman launched his attack in the middle of March on French media and then repeated it to The Times of London on March 28, 2021. He said that that after more than fifty years his conscience had suddenly awoken and forced to tell his story. We don’t know what really motivates him. Is he just someone who is pining for attention? An idle gossip? Is he simply mistaking the facts after so many years? Or suffering from the first signs of dementia?

It is certainly convenient for him to make his accusation after half a century. The accused is no longer there to defend himself. There are no witnesses we have heard from, memories have become blurred. Sorman’s story is, in any case, full of holes. I assume that he was not in the graveyard to watch the events. How then did he know what happened? Was it all hearsay? He is not the type to have been close to Foucault, though he is now said to have been a friend. Foucault did not gladly suffers types like him. He does not even say that had any conversations with Foucault – certainly not about sex. The words he records can mean anything and nothing. He claims that the boys were more than keen to take part in their own abuse but also that they were forced.

What is clear that the story is designed to do the maximum of damage to Foucault’s reputation. Not only is a he pedophile but he also desecrated Moslem graves thus revealing himself, in addition, to have been a racist. The right-wing have predictably made the accusation already grist for their mills. On April 2, The American Spectator published a piece under the headline “Michel Foucault and the Glamour of Evil” which said: “Foucault’s classroom ideas…  achieved the downfall of the university not by violent campus takeovers or hiring crackpots dispensing academic credit on public transportation. It came through the fact that a child rapist killed by the reality he dismissed as socially constructed convinced a massive portion [of] academia to cite him, assign him, and praise him. How to take such people seriously let alone as seriously as they take themselves? Pedophilia remains but one way to damage young people.” (https://spectator.org/michel-foucault-pedophilia/)

Another website casts the net even wider and includes also “progressive activists and politicians” in its catch. “Foucault is, unfortunately, one of the most influential philosophers of our era, the founder of “wokeness,” the father of critical race theory, and the man who lent academic credibility to progressive activists and politicians. His work was the inspiration for “queer theory.” Never mind that everyone of these points might be disputed.(https://www.lifesitenews.com/blogs/philosopher-michel-foucault-founder-of-wokeness-may-have-been-pedophile-rapist)

A third goes on to list names: “Every weirdo, every nutjob academic, every outlier, every criminal, every degenerate, has the roots of their intellectual justifications found in this deeply evil man’s brain. Among those who were comprehensively influenced by Foucault were Giorgio Agamben (“biopower”), Edward Said (“Post-colonial Studies”), Pierre Bourdieu (anthropology), Gilles Deleuze (metaphysics), Talal Asad (“Cultural Anthropology’), David Halperin (“Queer theory”), Hubert Dreyfus (AI), Paul Rabinow (Anthropology), Jacques Rancière (neo-Marxism), Félix Guattari (“Schizoanalysis”), and Stephen Greenblatt (“New Historicism”).” The article goes on to reserve. its special venom for Judith Butler. It concludes with the words: “If you are the disciple of a predatory child rapist, you need to re-evaluate your ideas. If your academic hero is a serial pedophile, there is no reason for anyone to listen to a word you have to say.” (https://devilslane.com/michel-foucault-prolific-serial-paedophile-rapist/)

When Foucault came to California, I had opportunity to talk to him extensively about sex and sexuality. There was never any suggestion in his words that he was drawn to pedophilia. He was preoccupied, rather, with the gay leather scene of San Francisco. One day he asked me about the bars South of Market. But since I had never been to any of them, I couldn’t tell him much. I knew, though, that they were hangouts for macho guys and not havens for pedophiles. On weekends he would occasionally pass by my house on the way to one of those places, dressed in black leather and wearing a motorcycle cap. I sometimes wondered what role he preferred in the volatile game of sado-masochism. My sense was that he was sexually submissive and that this was part of his fascination with the leather crowd on Folsom Street. He was certainly nothing like the child rapist that Sorman and his gang have unearthed in order to frighten postmodern thinking.

 

 

 

 

 

Welcome to the New Reality: Chinese farmers expelled from land to create “an old village to attract tourists”

Four people were killed when a man detonated a homemade bomb in a village in southern China. Local media said the blast occurred at the village committee office, which decides on matters linked to land use. Officials had given 270 acres of land to a developer in Shanghai last year to recreate an old village to attract tourists. Several people who claimed to be living near the area said online that the attack was triggered by a dispute over compensation.

 

The Deficiency Theory of Human Nature and Its Deficits

Thomas Hobbes writes famously in chapter 13 of his Leviathan that human life under natural conditions is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”[1] In order to live a social rather than a solitary life, a comfortable rather than a poor one, in order to live in a pleasantly civilized way rather than a nasty and brutish one, and in order to be long-lived rather than cut short in years, Hobbes argues, humans need to overcome their natural condition and create an artificial world, a second nature, a state, a commonwealth. Fortunately, they have “reason” which “suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement.”[2] These “laws of nature” allow them to create the desired “commonwealth” with its “commodious living.” But it is not inevitable that they will succeed in this undertaking. Hobbes writes in De Cive: “Men come together … not because naturally it could happen no otherwise, but by accident.”[3]

We can summarize his view in five points. (1) Humans must pursue a common good, if they are to thrive, (2) but they lack the natural capacity to pursue that end. (3) For they are naturally concerned only with their own private interest. (4) That may still allow limited and unstable forms of social interactions but it prevents the formation of organized society. (5) With the help of reason they can, however, construct conditions which make it possible to pursue the common good.

It is evident that Hobbes does not mean to say that human beings are like a species of solitary animal. For unlike solitary animals, humans cannot flourish in the wild. “It is true, indeed,” Hobbes writes, “that to man, by nature, or as man, that is as soon as he is born, solitude is an enemy.”[4] But man is also not “a creature born fit for society.” The Greeks and specifically Aristotle, called him a zoon politikon; “and on this foundation … they build up the doctrine of civil society … the preservation of peace and the government of mankind.” But this is “certainly false and an error proceeding from our too slight contemplation of human nature.”[5]

The natural inclination of human beings is rather to look only after themselves, their own private interests, and their own business. In the human case – in contrast to the genuinely solitary species – that turns out to be a serious deficiency. Even in the state of nature, human beings can and do, however, engage in some social interaction. In order to overcome someone stronger, a person may, for instance, even in the state of nature act “by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.”[6] Humans will thus act at times with “forces united.”[7]  They also compete with each other for scarce resources and thus become “enemies.” Mutual fear (or “diffidence” to use the original term) will make them seek “augmentation of dominion over men” and in their effort to gain glory, they will strive to “over-awe” each other. It is for such reasons, “that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war.”[8]  Competition, mutual fear, the desire to over-awe others, and warfare are, of course, all social phenomena. Human beings in the state of nature are for this reason not really  solitary beings. Their sociality is, rather, of an exclusively negative sort, restricted to eliminating, terrifying, over-powering, and fighting others.  Their kind of sociality is, moreover, highly unstable; it certainly cannot provide peace or security and thus prevents, among other things, the formation of any organized form of “society.” The most we can expect in this situation is “that brutish manner” which consists in “the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust.”[9] The conundrum is how to overcome this deficit in human sociality, how to create a positive sociality that allows for peaceful interactions, co-operative forms of living, of living well despite the preoccupation of human beings with their own private interests.

If “deficiency” refers to the absence of some quality and “deficit” to an insufficient degree of a quality, we can say that Hobbes combines a deficiency and a deficit view of human nature. Human beings lack, according to him, a natural capacity to pursue the common good and are in this way deficient.  And their deficiency restricts them to a limited, negative form of sociality. This is the deficit for which they are trying to make up. We can call this, then, the deficiency/deficit conception of human nature.

This conception was not Hobbes’ invention. We can find an earlier version of it in Protagoras, the sophistic Greek philosopher. In Plato’s eponymous dialogue, Protagoras explains his understanding of politics by means of a creation story in which human beings are initially left “naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed” and thus in a state of deficiency.[10] Their lack of social skills prevents them from living and working together. “They sought to save themselves by coming together and founding fortified cities, but when they gathered in communities, they injured one another for want of political skill.”[11] We can’t quite say then that these creatures are genuinely solitary since they appear to have the need and the desire to form communities, but they definitely lack the social skills for doing so. They can’t even successfully join forced long enough to defend themselves against wild animals, they are incapable of conducting war, and have no grasp of “the art of politics, of which the art of war is a part.”[12] Thus far their deficiency. But humans are also given a sense for mutual respect and justice, but this only in a rudimentary or dispositional form.  Wit the help of these, they can begin to form human communities but they suffer initially from a deficit in social skills which they need to overcome with nurture and education.

Protagoras’ story was given a new life in another creation myth that Plato told in his dialogue Politikos (The Statesman). In Plato’s version, the God Kronos created the world and initially took care of everything. But at some point, he withdrew from the cosmos and thus left humans to take care of themselves. But they turned out to be insufficiently equipped to rule themselves. The consequence is that they are bound to come to a bitter end unless the God returns to resume his divine nurture and save them. In this version, the human deficit is not apparent at the beginning, as it is in Protagoras’  account; it becomes manifest only after God has withdrawn. Politics is thus the doomed effort of human beings to take care of things in the face of God’s absence. Plato’s story is, in turn, reminiscent of that told in the Biblical book of Genesis. It, too, can be said to contain a version of the deficit conception of human nature. In the Garden of Eden, so we are told, Yahweh took care of all human needs. When Adam and Even make an attempt to take care of themselves, they are expelled from the garden and find themselves leading a life of bitterness and struggle. In the end God must come back once more to redeem his creation.

Hobbes will have known the Biblical story, but was he familiar with his other antecedents? His words certainly remind us of Protagoras, though it will become evident on a closer look that there are significant differences between the two views. We can see in any case that the deficiency/deficit theory of human nature has in one form of other had a long career.

I note in passing Nietzsche’s characterization of the human being as an underdetermined animal (das nicht festgestellte Tier), a more recent version of the deficit theory of human nature which has exerted influence on both philosophy – Max Scheler and Martin  Heidegger – and  anthropology – Helmut Plessner and Arnold Gehlen. Gehlen speaks thus explicitly of humans as “deficient beings” (Mängelwesen).  Deficit theory is, moreover, not confined to the Western tradition of political thinking. We can find another version of the it in the Chinese philosopher Xunzi. who is commonly said to have held that human nature is evil. But this rendering of his thought is misconceived for two reasons. The first is that the Chinese tradition does not operate with the Western and Christian concept of evil and the second that Xunzi is not arguing that human beings are permanently flawed. He is arguing instead, like Protagoras, that human beings are initially deficient and need to be socialized through nurture and education.

For all its wide spread and attraction, the deficiency/deficit theory of human nature is, however, incoherent. We can see this most clearly when we return to Hobbes. The first thing to notice is that his account of the all-important moment of transition from the state of nature to that of social and political order is utterly sketchy. It is, in fact, incomprehensible. We must ask: would solitary beings or, rather, beings restricted to pure negative forms of sociality be sharing a language in which to settle on articles of peace? And why would such nasty and brutish creatures be willing and able to negotiate with each other and put trust in the outcome of their negotiations? The answer has to be that asocial or minimally and negatively social beings can’t turn themselves by negotiation into positively social beings. Something similar holds for Protagoras and Xunzi. Beings with an innate deficit in social skills will not be able to turn themselves into social beings through education for it is only positively social beings that can educate each other.

Given this evident shortcoming of the deficiency/deficit theory, we need to ask why it has nonetheless been considered plausible. The answer seems to be that its proponents, either consciously or unconsciously,  see the life of the species on the model of the life of the individual human being. This looks at first sight like an attractive comparison. Don’t we sometimes speak of early human history as “the childhood of mankind”? The comparison is nonetheless misleading. It is, of course, true that the new-born baby is helpless and appears to lack functional social skills. Protagoras’ description of the initial condition of the human species as “naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed” fits precisely that state of a new-born baby. The denizens of Hobbes’ state of nature are, of course, more sinister creatures. Protagoras’ natural man is said to lack even the art of warfare whereas Hobbes’ counterpart is mysteriously equipped with precisely that art. For all that, he/she/it is just as helpless in trying to establish a proper social life as Protagoras’s unformed baby-like being.  Like new-born children, Hobbes’ creatures could, of course, never survive on their own. The new-born baby does so only because it is born into a social group (“the family”). It is this group which takes care of the child and helps it to become socialized. It should be obvious that the human species would be long extinct, if its initial state had been akin to that of a new-born because there would have been no one to take care of it.

The theory of evolution tells us that at any point in its development, the human species must have been fairly well adapted to its conditions of life because otherwise it would not be here today. There is no moment in that history in which the human species was in a state of deficiency or deficit. Human sociality is not a belated product of rational choice, but the outcome of a long, slow process of habituation and adaptation. The evolution of social behavior, it turns out, has proved beneficial in the process of natural selection. It is true that human beings are born helpless and without immediately available social skills. But this does not indicate that the species as a whole was initially in that state. The helplessness of the human child indicates, rather, that it belongs to a highly socialized species. Asocial species have no helpless offspring – otherwise they would die out.

Aristotle was closer to reality at this point than Hobbes, Protagoras, and Xunzi. He said that human beings are by nature political and that political institutions exist by nature. Hobbes attacked him, of course, for comparing animal gregariousness to human sociality. He had some justification for this in that neither he nor Aristotle had an evolutionary outlook. Both treated species as substantially fixed. And in that case it is not obvious why features found in one species should help to explain those in another.

The lack of an evolutionary perspective had another limiting effect on Aristotle. Like others, he found the closest affinity to the sociality of the human species in the life of the social insects. But insects are far apart from us on the evolutionary tree of life. A more instructive comparison is that of human sociality with the social life of primates. We can see from it that complex forms of social interaction, including nurture of the young, are already highly developed in some of primate species. It is reasonable then to conclude that the human species is “naturally a social species with complex skills that include both the capacity for teaching and for learning as well as a variety of other social and political skills.[14]

Aristotle appears right, also, in thinking that the distinctive form that human sociality has taken is largely due to the possession of a capacity for an advanced form of language. But his claim to that effect has been widely misinterpreted.  It has been taken to mean that humans have a mental capacity for rational thought whereas Aristotle’s term “logos” refers to language as a social phenomenon. Aristotle  recognizes  that some animals use primitive sign systems to communicate with each other. But only human logos or language allows for complex forms of deliberation. The possession of such language characterizes the distinctive form of human sociality and it provides the human species with a tool for conceiving new forms of socialization. Where animal gregariousness is fixed, human sociality is thus malleable. It is characteristic of human sociality that we can choose between different forms of political order. It is from this kind of sociality that also our distinctively human individualism has emerged. That is evident from the fact that we define ourselves as individuals by means of language.  Human individuality is, in other words, a product (we might even say, a by-product) of human sociality and it is maintained only by this form of sociality. It is this individuality, moreover, that gives human politics its distinctive character.  Aristotle conclusion that political institutions are by nature prior to the individual – an idea that was, surely, incomprehensible for Hobbes – is the outcome of this line of thinking.

Aristotle’s lack of attention to the social life of primates (in fact, his lack of knowledge of this pre-human form of sociability) had, however, also the  consequence that he downplayed the role of conflict in human life, in contrast to Hobbes who highlighted this aspect of human behavior. Warfare, competition for resources, and social fear are not fundamental to Aristotle’s way of thinking. He knows that there is warfare and that political institutions must be ready to deal with conflict and violence. But war signals for him a failure of politics. Aristotle would never have been able to assent to Clausewitz’ characterization of war as the continuation of politics by other means and he would have been even less receptive to Carl Schmitt’s and Michel Foucault’s reverse description of politics as the continuation of war by other means. For Hobbes there is a constant struggle for power in the natural condition of the human species. Where human beings seek to over-awe each other in his world, Aristotle assumes that there is a natural and fixed order of rank between them. The struggle for power is thus secondary for him. This view is once again linked to Aristotle’s conception of animal gregariousness and its relation to human politics. The interactions of the social insects are  genetically determined and there is, as a result no warfare, no competition for resources, no mutual fear, nor a struggle for power in the beehive or the antheap. The life of the social insects is one of positive sociality. To say it in other words: where Aristotle’s sees human society as a fundamentally collaborative undertaking and based on a natural drive to cooperation, It is for precisely this reason that Hobbes considers Aristotle’s account of animal gregariousness irrelevant to the understanding of human sociality and politics.

If Aristotle and Hobbes had paid attention to (or known of) the sociality of primates, they  might, however, have both felt the need to revise their accounts. For in primate life we certainly find all the elements of negative sociality that Hobbes had identified. There is conflict, competition for resources, there is mutual fear, and there is a constant ongoing struggle for power. But this is not sufficient to justify his account of human politics. The actual situation is, rather, that in primate life we find both negative and positive sociality conjoined. It is thus not the case, as Hobbes thought, that negative sociality is primary and fundamental and that positive sociality is a secondary and derivate construction designed to overcome or, at least alleviate the facts of negative sociality. But Aristotle’s view is also unsatisfactory for looking only at the life of the social insects he did not see that species more closely related to us depict a more complex pattern of sociality. The right picture is then that Aristotle and Hobbes have each identified only one side of human sociality and thus of human politics. A properly evolutionary view will have to recognize that we share with our pre-human relatives a mixture of both negative and positive social drives and capacities. It is this mixture that contributes to the characteristic complexity and volatility of our kind of social and political life.

There is, however, nothing inherently deficient in this. The peculiar dual nature of human sociality has contributed greatly to the success of our species. The deficiency/deficit theory of human nature is for that reason misguided. This does not mean that the combination of positive and negative social drives and capacities that has proved so successful in the struggle for human survival will continue to do so forever. It may turn out that our specific biological endowment will eventually bring about the decline of the species. At that point we would discover that human nature has finally become deficient. It is not the case then that deficiency marks the initial state of human evolution (and is “natural” in that sense). The deficiency of human nature may rather be still ahead of us. And it may then turn out that we lack the means for creating a second nature that will allow us to overcome that deficiency.

Notes

[1] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Michael Oakeshott, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 82 (Hereafter cited as “L”)

[2] L, p. 84

[3] Thomas Hobbes, De Cive or The Citizen, edited by Sterling P. Lamprecht, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York 1949, p. 22. (Hereafter cited as “C”)

[4] C, p. 21, note.

[5] C, pp. 21-22.

[6] L, p. 80.

[7] L, p. 81.

[8] L, pp. 81-82

[9] L, p. 83.

[10] Plato, The Protagoras, 321c in Plato, Protagoras and Meno, , translated by W.K.C. Guthrie, Penguin Books, London 1956

[11] Ibid, 322b.

[12] Ibid.

[13] In De Cive, though not in Leviathan, Hobbes also recognizes the role of education in socializing human beings. He writes there: “Man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education.” (p. 22. footnote)

[14] Frans de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics. Power and Sex Among Apes, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, rev. ed. 1988.

“Benevolent Autocracy.” The case of Hong Kong

On January 4, 2021, 1,000 Hong Kong police went out to arrest fifty-three democratic lawmakers, politicians, and activists. The event was as much a demonstration of unrestrained police power as an actual  police operation. The arrested were, moreover, charged with a strange crime, namely “trying to use strategic voting to secure a legislative majority, with an ultimate goal of shutting down the government.”[1] They had organized a primary election to produce a slate of democratic candidates for the then upcoming election to Hong Kong’s legislature. 600,000 Hong Kongers had cast their vote on that occasion.  The democrats had also expressed hope that their united front might gain a majority of the seats in the new legislature. Benny Tai, one of the initiators of the event, had, moreover, suggested in a newspaper op-ed that such a majority might eventually be able to veto the city’s budget and, perhaps, even push its unloved Chief Executive to resign.

According to the city’s Basic Law “Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration, and to form and join trade unions, and to strike.” It also promised that “the freedom of the person of Hong Kong residents shall be inviolable. No Hong Kong resident shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention or imprisonment. Arbitrary or unlawful search of the body of any resident or deprivation or restriction of the freedom of the person shall be prohibited.”[2] So, how was it possible that residents were arrested for organizing a primary election, for making it their goal to gain a majority in the legislature, and for describing how such a majority might be used? In a normal democracy those activities would be considered unproblematic; How could they be illegal in Hong Kong? The answer is to be found in a National Security Law that had been impose on the city half a year earlier. Article 22 of that law declared, among other things, any person “who organises, plans, commits or participates in … seriously interfering in, disrupting, or undermining the performance of duties and functions in accordance with the law by … the body of power of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” to be guilty of an act of subversion punishable in the most serious case by life-imprisonment. The terms of the article are obviously slippery and wide enough to catch anyone trying to mount a serious opposition to those in power.

The January 4th arrests occurred in the middle of coronavirus epidemic that occupied the attention of people both in Hong Kong and the rest of the world. It took place also as the world’s political attention was focused on the dramatic struggle of the presidential transition in the US. The arrests nevertheless evoked widespread condemnation. But broadside attacks on democratic activity had, in fact, had a long history in Hong Kong and went back to the very beginnings of the city.[3]

The accidental city

When the British took possession of Hong Kong Island in 1841, they chose it as a trading center and military outpost. They never envisaged that they were founding a city which would one day have millions of inhabitants with their manifold economic and administrative needs and their personal and political aspirations. At the time the island was only sparsely populated, mostly by the descendants of Ming dynasty loyalists who had fought a losing battle against the incoming Manchu Qing. Over time these people had turned into pirates making their living from the sea. In 1860, the British forced the Chinese into a treaty “in perpetuity” that awarded them Kowloon, an undeveloped strip of the mainland across from the island. Almost twenty years later, in 1879, the British got China to cede them an additional area of agricultural land,  “the New Territories,” on a rent-free 99-year lease.  Like the original island colony, these new possessions were only thinly populated.  There were numerous villages but no towns or cities. In 1851, the size of the population in the entire British area was estimated at roughly 34,000 inhabitants. Fifty years later that number had increased tenfold to 370,000. By 1951 it had grown to two million and today the Special Administrative Region counts almost eight million inhabitants. In the 180 years since the British came to the island, Hong Kong had developed from an insignificant spot in the South China Sea into a global city with a teeming population and the densest collection of high rises on earth.

These circumstances have shaped the unique political destiny of the British colony. From the start it was located at the intersection of two great empires. It was not a city with a deep history, a long-settled population, with a clear perception of its identity and traditional institutions and practices. It was never planned or even conceived to be what it has become.

The British colonialists who took the territory had no idea of what they were getting into. From their point of view the new colony was a place from which they could trade their opium and other goods more safely than from the ancient Chinese city of Guangzhou upstream on the Pearl river.  The deep harbor, sheltered from the southern Typhoons, also proved a suitable stopover for Britain’s globe-spanning navy. But there were no political institutions to take over, no city or state to govern.

If you went into India, you knew that you were dealing with a country, a people, with own rulers and ancient political institutions. None of this was true in Hong Kong. And so the British ruled their colony as a possession directly from London and continued to do so from 1841 to the moment of its return to China in 1997. None of their other colonies was treated in that way.  Over time, the colonial rulers advanced a variety of reasons why they persisted in this manner, even as a city was coming into existence on their territory.

The crown colony

For the British colonialists “Hong Kong’s original status as an integral part of the Chinese empire could never be discounted because the Chinese themselves refused to do so, leaving uncertain the exact nature of its standing as a full-fledged British possession.” (p. 27) The task of the first governor was thus simply to create and maintain “‘an emporium for our trade and a place from which Her Majesty’s subjects in China may be alike protected and controlled.;” (p. 38) Hong Kong – “the Gibraltar of the east’ as the British came to call it – could for this reason be only a “crown colony” – forever ruled directly from the Colonial Office in London. The appropriate form of governing the place was a “benevolent autocracy.” (p. 19)

As more people settled in the colony this policy became, however, inevitably a point of contention. When local merchants in the 1880s called for some form of accountability for the taxes they were paying, the then Governor George Bowen insisted that elections were only “an inconvenience” and impractical at that because of Hong Kong’s heterogeneous population. Chinese views, habits, and customs on social and political questions were “widely different from those entertained in Europe,” he argued, and a local council “in which the Chinese element would be largely predominant” could not be trusted to deal with “arrangements necessary for the health, good order, and general administration” of the territory. (p. 51)

Over time the authorities in both London and Hong Kong came up with ever new reasons why there could be no politics in the colony, no political representation, no elections, and no democracy. Though there had been political agitation and organizing in the territory since the beginning, the British kept insisting that the Chinese were inherently apathetic and politically indifferent. “These claims persisted, incredibly, throughout the turbulent events of China’s 20th-century history, all off which spilled over one way or another into Hong Kong.” (p. 66) The authorities also maintained that the Chinese inhabitants of the place were not really settled in Hong Kong, that they were rally only transients, and they pointed out that they were, in any case, not British subjects and hence could not be given political rights. Democracy and elections, they said, were, in fact, essentially Western and in conflict with the Confucian way of thinking. James Lockhart, the Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong, in the 1890’s was to write: “The modern idea of ‘one man, one vote’ is one which the Chinaman can hardly comprehend, and if he does succeed in grasping its meaning, it is an idea which does not appeal to him, as it is opposed to the constitution of society and the theory of government of China.” While some Chinese might be attracted to the idea of democracy, as they showed by agitating for it, such people were “not representative of the Chinese view.” (p. 74)

This attitude did not change much over time. In 1965, Alexander Grantham, another governor of Hong Kong, maintained once again that the Chinese were “generally speaking, politically apathetic. They did not regard themselves as permanent citizen and felt little loyalty.” (p. 101) Two years later, yet another governor, David Trench, wrote: “We have hitherto always been cautious about explaining publicly the basic reason why Hong Kong cannot develop fully representative institutions.” Normal self-government was not possible in Hong Kong because of its “particular relationship with China.” (pp. 144-145)

Throughout the colonial period, there had nevertheless been continued political agitation by the inhabitants of the growing city. In response, the British authorities proposed and abandoned a series of plans for reform; they took steps forwards and back, they made this or that small political concession. But at the end there were still no elections, there was no representative legislature; there were still only the English officials appointed in Whitehall. Political protests were ignored, downplayed, or suppressed. In order to maintain their control over the colony, the British instituted a multiplicity of repressive measures during the 1950s. “A new Registration Ordinance required everyone to be photographed and fingerprinted. Deportation ordinances were strengthened … The old sedition law was updated, but definitions remained expansive, being applied both to speech and the printed word, including its publication, sale, distribution, possession, and reproduction. Seditious intent was equally expansive, meaning anything from encouraging ‘discontent or disaffection’ to inciting contempt for the government… All groups were required to apply for registration. Grounds for denial included affiliations of a political nature outside the colony, as well as purposes deemed inimical to its ‘peace, welfare or good order.’ A new labor law banned strikes for purposes other than work-related disputes.” The governor was given blanket powers “to make any regulation whatsoever” in case of danger or emergency. “In rapid succession hundreds of activists were deported to China. … Deportees found themselves arrested and escorted to the border, all within hours. Dozens of social groups were also denied registration, declared, illegal, and dissolved.” (pp. 111-112) And while these policies were meant in the first place to suppress communist agitation, they extended at the same time liberally to all other political activity.

When the Chinese introduced their own tough national security measures in Hong Kong in 2020 after months of civil unrest, they could gleefully refer to these British colonial policies as the precedent and justification for their own way of dealing with dissidents. It turned out that both London and Beijing were motivated by the same idea and that was not just to control dissent and to resist democratic reform, but to stop all political activism in its track.

Political agitation came from both communist and the democratic activists. Polls show that the communists had a core constituency of about 25% of the population but could draw at times on support from more than a third of the people. This support was particularly strong among working-class Hong Kongers. The strongest labor union was n fact, firmly on the communist side. The democrats who attracted more of the middle-class could, in turn, rely on a core constituency of 30% with broader support from up to 60% of Hong-Kongers. The disequilibrium was due to the fact that many of the city’s inhabitants had fled from the mainland at some time or other after the Communist victory in 1949. Both sides were nonetheless sufficiently strong and committed to cause trouble for the authorities, first the British and then the Chinese, and the two responded to that threat with comparable measures. While the two sides subscribed to very different ideologies, the technical means for controlling dissent proved essentially the same and thus ideologically neutral. Or to say it in another way: The means of social control and political suppression are not political in that they are readily available to any political system.

An experiment in democracy

Political change had been slow in the crown colony from the time of Queen Victoria to the premiership of Margaret Thatcher. But things began to change in the 1970’s when China made clear to the British that they were demanding the return of the entire colony with the expiration of the 99-year lease of the New Territories. The British, who were keen on expanding their economic opportunities in China at the time saw no other option than to prepare for that event. They now set belatedly new policies into motion such as a public housing program and a public education and health care system all of which had been limited and in private hands until then. They also began to negotiate with Beijing the conditions of the return of Honk Kong to Chinese sovereignty.

The outcome of that negotiation was a joint declaration concerning the future of Hong Kong signed on September 26, 1984. The document declared that “the current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style. Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be ensured by law… Private property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign investment will be protected by law.” The document was less specific about the future political arrangements. It declared that the government of the new Special Administrative Region (SAR) “will be composed of local inhabitants” including Chinese, British, and other foreign nationals. It also specified that the new chief executive would be “appointed by the Central People’s Government” though “on the basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held locally.” And a new Basic Law for the SAR was to be drafted by a working committee chosen by Beijing.  But the joint declaration made no other promises concerning the political freedom of the people of Hong Kong.

It was at this point that the British decided to implement a series of political reforms to be put in place before the handover of Hong Kong in 1997. In London, Margaret Thatcher had been replaced by the more liberal John Major who was determined to advance this cause and in Hong Kong Chris Patten, the new and last British governor, eagerly pursued the issue. Suddenly, political parties were permitted and elections were to be held for district councils and the legislature. A new openness was practiced in the actions of government. This belated move provoked, however, heated protests from Beijing. The British were not acting in line with the Joint Declaration, the Chinese complained and they had a point.  Beijing’s campaign “focused its venom on London’s duplicity, on its determination to retain influence in Hong Kong beyond 1997, and on the old idea of a Western conspiracy updated for 1990’s use: Hong Kong was to become a bridgehead for democratizing China.” (p. 246) The popular Chinese press denounced Governor Patten as the “demagogue of democracy” and “sinner of the millennium.” (p. 246)

The last-minute changes in the governance of Hong Kong, in fact, brought together a curious coalition of opponents. The pro-Beijing leftists in Hong Kong concurred, of course, with the rhetoric coming from the mainland. But they gained surprising support from the conservative Hong Kong business sector. “Politically ‘conservative’ pro- and anti-communists were now discovering they actually had more in common with each other than with what they regarded as the ‘radical’ reformers in their midst.” (p. 233) And if this was not enough, a third front of opposition was opened up by conservatives outside Hong Kong.

In the Hong Kong business community the anti-democratic were strong. Hong Kong conservatives were taking their inspiration from Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman and feared above all that an electoral system would lead inevitably to welfare economics. To combat that development, the electronic manufacturer and conservative politician Allen Lee founded a pro-business party in 1993, misleadingly called the “Liberal Party,” which from the start took a strong a pro-Beijing stance. His successor as leader of that party was  James Tien, chairman of the General Chamber of Commerce who “went on the offensive in 1996, targeting Legco’s new grassroots representation.” (p. 289) Tien deplored, in particular, the attempt of the new legislators to push towards “severance pay, maternity leave, gender discrimination, and disability allowances.” He looked forward, instead, to the handover and a new administration that would seek to recreate “Hong-Kong’s business-friendly environment.” (p. 289)

Such arguments were taken by others looking at Hong Kong from the outside. Murray Maclehose, a former governor, complained bitterly about the belated democratic reforms. The fact that there were different political parties with their opposing agendas was threatening Hong Kong’s stability, he maintained, and investor confidence.  Lee Kuan Yew came specially to the city to warn against democracy.  “He commended instead the formula he had perfected for Singapore: concentrate on economics, learn better English, and leave politics to your leaders.” (p. 250)

The economic city

              The formula on which all these parties came to agree was that of Hong Kong as an “economic” city, not a political one. With this idea both the anti-democratic left and the anti-democratic conservatives could be happy. Beijing went on to accuse the British of turning Hong Kong into political city with their belated democratic reforms and announced its determination all such measures with the handover. “Colonial Hong Kong’s mix of capitalism and autocratic rule was just the sort of combination Beijing aimed to achieve nationwide, even as the West saw in Hong Kong’s economic rights and social freedoms the thin edge of a wedge, that anticipated Chinese communism’s demise.” (p. 9)

The Chinese resistance to the political city was encoded in the new Basic Law for the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong which had been worked out by a carefully selected working committee in Beijing. The Basic Law promised elections at some time in the future as the ultimate outcome of a slow, step-by-step process. “The most feared elements of mainland-style dictatorship were kept in check, but so too were local aspirations for a faster pace of democratic reform.” (p. 297) The political system was to be one of “executive-led government” not of the people or the legislature. The legislature was to have only a limited powers and an essentially consultative function. This was, in effect, the original British conception of “benevolent autocracy” all over again. What this meant became quickly clear from the figures Beijing appointed to govern the autonomous region.

The first chief executive was to be Tung Chee-hwa, a wealthy Hong Kong tycoon without previous political experience or interest. Forbes magazine estimated the wealth of the family as being at 3 billion US dollars in 2008. The son of a shipping magnate, Tung had spent several years in England and the United States. He had not been affiliated with any political before the handover, but his thinking about the city ran in perfect parallel to Beijing’s. For Tung there was an ongoing struggle between Western and Confucian values. And he perceived his task for that reason to be that of containing the dangers of Western permissiveness and politics, Hong Kong needed for this reason to tighten its rules governing civil liberties and elections. “The image his staff spun out was one of a paternalistic executive toiling from dawn to dusk and beyond on Hong Kong’s behalf.” (p. 325)

Other prominent Hong Kong tycoons found themselves in agreement with these sentiments. Ronnie Chan, the billionaire property magnate came to insist that Western style liberal democracy was imperfect, contrary to human nature, and bad for business. (p. 339) Peter Woo, like Chan a major real estate holder, argued that there was link between electoral politics and government deficits, and Gordon Woo, a Princeton alumnus and chairman of Hopewell Holdings, maintained that democracy would spell disaster because democrats knew nothing about economics.  Tung Chee-hwa was, in turn, to come back to this point later on, in 2016, when he “hailed the Chinese model of democracy, while warning that competitive elections could lead to political instability and separatism.” The Hong Kong Free Press reported him at the time as saying:   “We are not denying the importance of democracy, but we are definitely wrong if we consider competitive elections to be a main – or the only – component of democracy.”[4]

Capitalism vs. democracy

It has been said again and again that there exists a natural affinity between capitalism and democracy and perhaps even a necessary relation that economic and political liberty go together. The argument for this claim has always been murky. If I want to be free to do one thing and you want to be free to do another, what we both want is, in one sense the same. But our shared pursuit of freedom may nonetheless lead us into conflict.  If I want to be free to engage in an unhampered pursuit of economic gain and you want to be free to organize politically to regulate and constrain my actions, then it is evident that your economic freedom and my political freedom conflict.  The story of Hong Kong teaches us, in any case, that capitalism and democracy do not necessarily go together. In the 150 years of the crown colony, autocracy and capitalism always found it easy to coexist and, indeed, to profit from each other. And when change finally came, the Hong capitalists had compelling reasons for resisting democratic reform. They have found it convenient ever since to align themselves with the anti-democratic policies of the Beijing authorities.

Hong Kong’s Basic Law was, in fact, an unstable compromise and this ensured that the conflict over democracy would continue after the handover. On the one hand the Basic Law was meant to reverse the democratic reforms that the British had finally put into place, but it also made some concessions to the demand for democracy and promised more for later. In its preamble, the Basic Law invoked the slogan of “one country, two systems” slogan and declared that under this principle “the socialist system and policies will not be practised in Hong Kong.”  For Beijing this meant the coexistence of two kinds of economic system, not that of two political systems. The final version of the Basic Law had been approved in February 1990 only nine months after the bloody evens in Tiananmen Square. “Tiananmen and its aftermath may have shocked Hong Kong into an unprecedented level of agreement with liberal demands, but the shoe was no on the other foot as Beijing adopted London’s old logic about democracy’s disruptive potential.” (p. 222)

Beijing made sure for that reason that it kept complete control over the choice of the chief executive.  Article 45 of the Basic Law specified that “the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People’s Government.” But it went on to say that “the method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”  An appendix to the Basic law then specified the composition of an election committee which permanently restricted democratic representatives to an ineffective minority. And while article 45 also envisaged that the ultimate aim was the election of the chief executive by universal suffrage, it didn’t say when this moment would come. Beijing, in other words, reserved for itself the right to control the he appointment of the Chief Executive.

Another sticking point was article 23 of the Basic Law which said: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government.” But when the administration of Chief Executive Tung set out to implement such a law article 23, it provoked  strong public protest which culminated in a devastating mass demonstration on July 1, 2003. The outcome was an indefinite postponement of the bill. This turned out to be deadly blow to Tung’s administration and after a series of further missteps Tung resigned prematurely in early 2005 to be followed the former finance secretary, Donald Tsang.

If this was not enough, the Basic Law also reserved for Beijing the right to “interpret” and “amend” it. (Articles 158 and 159). When it became clear after the July 2003 demonstrations, that the democrats might actually win a legislative majority in the next election, Beijing decided to step in and make use of its power of interpretation. “Beijing’s Hong Kong policy was driven thereafter by two aims: denying the goal of full democracy in 2008-2008, and preventing ad democratic Legco majority in September 2004.” (p. 370) Beijing decided to intervene in the upcoming election by denouncing the democratic leaders as “unpatriotic.” In the end, the democrats won only 25 out of sixty seats. And Beijing also ruled out any political reform for 2007-2008. Election by universal suffrage for the chief executive and the legislature were definitely ruled out.

In the years that followed, the Beijing authorities and their Hong Kong followers continued to hack away at the freedoms the Basic Law guaranteed the city’s residents. In 2019 unrest erupted over an extradition law that the administration of Carrie Lam sought to implement. The turmoil lasted for months and ended with Beijing’s imposition of a National Security Law on the city.  This was in clear breach of the Basic Law which specified that it was up to Hong Kong to implement such legislation. But by that time, it was clear that the mainland authorities were set to override the Basic Law wherever they saw fit. The Chinese Foreign Ministry had had already, in 2017, dismissed the original Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong as a “historical document that no longer has any realistic meaning” The Declaration, so the Ministry had said, “does not have any binding power on how the Chinese central government administers Hong Kong. Britain has no sovereignty, no governing power and no supervising power over Hong Kong.”[5] It was, of course, on this Declaration that the “rights and freedoms” of the people in Hong Kong, their freedom “of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association” was ultimately based. With the national security law of 2020, that  initial guarantee of autonomy for fifty years and the promise that the Hong Kong citizens could maintain their freedom and life style in this period had lost their validity. Hong was now to be integrated into the mainland and its political culture. All the while, Beijing was insisting that the “one country, two systems” policy would be continued. But it was clear that this meant only the continuation of the capitalist market system in Hong Kong not that of its previous political structure. The upcoming elections for the legislature in which the democrats might have triumphed were postponed for at least year – due, it was said, to the coronavirus pandemic – Meanwhile Beijing was pondering a drastic overhaul of the election rules to make sure once and for all the democrats would have retain no practical influence on the selection of the next chief executive and prove unable to take control of the legislature.  “As part of sweeping proposals that sources said were meant to disempower the district councillors – many of whom were protesters and activists who won their seats riding on a wave of public discontent in last year’s elections – the city’s pro-establishment members were also lobbying Beijing to get rid of five so-called super seats from the local electoral map. Again, the intent was to erode the relevance of the opposition councillors.”[6]

The implementation of the national security law initiated a series of measures evidently designed to silence political activity. They ranged from serious to small-minded. A sample will have to suffice to indicate their nature.

Hong Kong, it was clear, was to be an economic city and not a political one. After Beijing expelled four democratic lawmakers from the legislature for being insufficiently patriotic and the remaining democratic legislators resigned, Carrie Lam, the chief executive, expressed her satisfaction. A legislature without opposition was so much “more rational” she said. “Now… with the security law, law and order has been restored. Chaos has been replaced by peacefulness.”[7]

Conclusion

For almost two centuries, Hong Kong has played a pivotal role in the West’s relation with China. Much can be learned from this story about British and Western colonialism and imperialism and about China’s struggle with these outside forces. But equally important lessons can be derived from it concerning the general themes of autocracy and democracy, of capitalism and communism, and of the meaning of politics itself.

The distinction between economics and politics which both the British colonial authorities and the post-colonial Chinese and Hong Kong powers have evoked deserves our particular attention. It denies, of course, that mainstay of capitalist theorizing according to which there is an integral link between capitalism and democracy. But it is of even greater interest for the light it throws on the implied understanding of politics. The understanding is that the organization, administration, government, and maintenance of a city (or a state) is a technical and economic matter and as such apolitical. Politics, on the other hand, is a matter of giving those who are administered in the city a voice in how they are governed. As such it is inherently democratic. But as democratic it also involves debate, argument, disagreement, partisanship, opposition, and even conflict. These activities are a mere hindrance to the technical task of administering.

That there is such a distinction has been made plausible by Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition. In a more common usage, we tend to think of politics as embracing everything that has to do with government and the state. That formula goes back to Plato and Aristotle who characterized politics as the rule of the polis. Arendt may be right in saying that Plato and Aristotle have made us think about politics above all as establishing and maintaining order, and therefore also as crucially concerned with the making and applying of law. On Arendt’s view this has opened the possibility of a totalitarian politics committed to establishing a single, all-embracing order in the state. On this view, the most totalitarian state is also the most political one. But once we focus on the other side of politics, its participatory character, we will conclude that the totalitarian state is, in fact, the least political. The conception of a merely economic city approximates the totalitarian understanding of politics.

Notes

[1] “Hong Kong police say 53 were arrested for trying to use strategic voting to win election, veto budget & shut down gov’t”, Hong Kong Free Press, January 5, 2021

[2] Basic Law, articles 27 and 28.

[3] The following account draws substantially on Suzanne Pepper’s Keeping Democracy at Bay. Hong Kong and the Challenge of Chinese Political Reform, Rowman & Littlefield, London 2008. All further references are to that book.

[4] HKFP, Dec. 20, 2016

[5] “Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong ‘no longer has any realistic meaning’, Chinese Foreign Ministry says,” South China Morning Post, June 30, 2017

[6] “Beijing mulling drastic overhaul of Election Committee deciding Hong Kong’s chief executive and Legislative Council to curb opposition’s influence,” SCMP, Dec. 22, 2020

[7] KHFP, Nov. 24, 2020

Breaking Democracy’s Spell

 “It is hard to see the citizenry of the United States at present as especially successful in furnishing themselves with good government under their uniquely time-tested and elastic democratic formula,” John Dunn, the English political theorist, observes in his profoundly unsettling book Breaking Democracy’s Spell.[1] He goes on to ask: “Is American government today so confused, so fractious, and so dysfunctional despite democracy or because of democracy?”[2] Americans are confused, he says, about what democracy means and what it can do. The idea of democracy has become a baffling maze with many dead ends. Democracy is in a state of disorientation.

Published in 2014, Breaking Democracy’s Spell is based on lectures Dunn had delivered at Yale University three years earlier.[2] If Dunn was right in his judgment on American politics in and 2011 and 2014, he is proven even more so today in 2020. The Trump administration’s response to the coronavirus pandemic has made the current lack of good government in the United States all too obvious. That is particularly jarring when one compares the American  response to the pandemic with China’s. After some fumbling, China’s authoritarian regime managed to get the spread of the virus under control, whereas the United States has failed spectacularly both at the federal and the state level. The pandemic has exposed serious fissures in the American healthcare system, deep social and racial inequalities, the incapacity of the incumbent president to deal coherently with an unexpected situation and the ideological blinders of his party. Add to this Trump’s lack of will to deal with an ever more urgent environmental crisis, his neglect of the national infrastructure, and the increasing noise of an aggressive nationalism that he has promoted and you are facing a disturbingly malfunctioning political system. How can one avoid Dunn’s questions about the state of American democracy? Why is American government so confused, fractious, and dysfunctional and how does democracy contribute to its inability to solve even its most pressing problems?

Dunn’s concern stems from years of reflection on democracy and the state of global society.[4] Democracy, he concludes in Breaking Democracy’s Spell, has become “the master idea” in terms of which we seek to understand and assess almost all politics today. But in this process the concept has lost its precise contours. Dunn is convinced that “we need to learn to understand democracy very differently, hear it with less self-congratulatory ears, recognize more accurately where its real potency comes from, and face up to the limits of its capacity to direct our political purposes.”  As we find ourselves confronted with numerous intractable problems and, in particular, with threats to the survival of the entire human species,  “we need to find a way out of the maze democracy has become for us and face the awesome decisions that lie ahead as directly and lucidly as we can.”[5] The financial crisis of 2008, the uncontrolled  turmoil of the Middle East, and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima serve him as evidence that nothing less is needed than a determination “to reconsider and reengineer the entire causal web within which our species now lives.”[6]

In addressing his American audience in 2011, Dunn’s had meant to dislodge what he took to be a wide-spread American complacency about its political system. “It is natural for Americans … to think of democracy as a synonym for good government,” he writes in Breaking Democracy’s Spell.[7]  The Americans have seen themselves, in fact, as uniquely blessed by their democratic form of government. “The American Dream has exerted astonishing power over a large and extravagantly variegated population across an impressive arc of time.”[8] But not everyone shares this view. “To others in lands at varying distances away, the power held and exerted by the United State has usually seemed very different… It has looked and felt far less mesmerizing and also often quite menacing.”[9] It is necessary therefore to break the mesmerizing spell that the idea of democracy still exerts on the American imagination because it prevents a realistic, sober, and properly skeptical assessment of democracy.

Dunn’s book is not limited to a critique of the American conception of democracy and of the American style of politics. The problem Dunn seeks to identify is rather inherent in the very idea of democracy. He argues that the term democracy has acquired for us an equivocal meaning in that it refers to both an abstract ideal concerning the exercise of power and to a particular conception of the practical arrangement of government. And: “A term that equivocates in this way between an authoritative standard of right conduct and the practical character of an existing regime,” Dunn argues, “is a ready source of confusion even for those professionally dedicated to keeping their own thinking and speech clear.”[10]

The confusion matters for all of us, because all other forms of rule – monarchical or oligarchic in the broadest sense – have become “obsolete and inherently implausible.” We must face then “the deep unclarity and instability of the master idea through which we seek to take our bearings.”[11] What does democracy as an ideal or standard come to? Dunn seeks to avoid idealizing all hyperbole and describes democracy as being fundamentally “a formula for imagining subjection to the power and will of others without sacrificing personal dignity or voluntarily jeopardizing individual or family interests.”[12] All exercise of governmental power “asserts, requires and imposes” and thus calls for subjection. But “subjection is an inherently distasteful and degrading condition.” The allure of democracy is that it promises to ensure the service of the interests of the citizens better than other regimes and thus makes subjection to power more bearable. But in reality, democratic government has “sometimes come out badly wrong and will surely often do so again.”[13] The promise of democracy is for that reason always tentative.

Dunn’s characterization of democracy assumes an original and prevailing inequality among human beings. Subjection to power is inevitable but the inequalities on which it operates can be mitigated. Dunn’s formula bypasses the idea of self-rule as constitutive of the concept of democracy. He writes: “Collective action very much remains, and is certain to continue to prove, an inherently puzzling project.”[14]  Such action is conceivable only if there exists a demos. But how can a demos exist? “There is a clear and perhaps unwelcome answer. It can do so only where shared sentiments, perceptions, and beliefs arise and persist in time and space, and by doing so, create at least the possibility of a common interest.”[15] And there is no guarantee that there is such a demos.  “Where there is no such reasonably convergent orientation (no clear common interest), what emerges from democratic decision is either contingent confusion or, at best, a lucky fluke.”[16] It is, in any case, true that a demos “plainly cannot in practice now rule in the United States or anywhere else.”[17] (p. 28) It does not help much to think about democracy in terms of the notion of the sovereignty of the people.

 

Democracy is also not the same as the rule of law and “the rule of law is, still more evidently, not democracy.” Dunn is convinced that, “on balance, the populations of Europe and North America today probably value legality quite a lot more than they do democracy.”[18] The benefits of legality are, in any case, often more direct and more tangible to the individual than those of democracy. It follows, if Dunn is right, that this preference may incline people in favor of authoritarian and non-democratic forms of government as long as that government can more or less guarantee the rule of law – at least, for a substantial number of the population.

Democracy is also not the same as a socially and culturally tolerant liberalism; it is equally not the same as adherence to a free market capitalism, even though these have come to be associated for us, and, in particular, in the American imagination with the idea of democracy. What we have in the American understanding of democracy is a historically contingent amalgam consisting of the minimal conception of democracy contained in Dunn’s own formula, an unrealistic belief in the sovereignty of the people, in the rule of law, in policies of toleration, and in a free market system. If we are to achieve a better understanding of democracy, Dunn s convinced, we need to sort out how these components may come into conflict with each other and how they are, in fact, doing so in the United States and other places.

Democracy, it turns out, ”has not proved a dependable heuristic for a latent normative order in any society we know.”[19]  The result is a deepening sense of political disorientation. “All this too is part of democracy’s disorientation – the degree to which it confuses our efforts to judge collectively and the intimidating impact of the consequences of that confusion on our disposition even to try to.”[20]

Our problem is ultimately a cognitive one and as such a problem that goes far beyond the issue of democracy. “We do not understand the world we so precariously share, and we do not understand it, in very large measure, because of the severely limited degree to which we understand one another or grasp what virtually all the world’s other inhabitants really care about or why they care about it as they do.”[21] Dunn seeks to remind us of the cognitive limitations of our understanding of our social and political reality. “That cognitive constriction is not an intellectual failure of the present membership of our species (or professions), which might in principle be remedied by future enhancements of our performance.  It is an ontological feature of the world, given by where and what we are, and we cannot hope to move briskly beyond it.”[22]

Dunn ends his book with sobering words: “Could human beings do any better in the face of the chaos they have made together? The answer to that can only be yes. Will they do any better, and, above all, will they do better enough? Quite probably not… How far can human beings learn? In the end they will find out.”[23]

 

Notes

[1] John Dunn, Breaking Democracy’s Spell, Yale University Press, New Haven & London 2014, p. 44.

[2] Recordings of these lectures, delivered under the title “Beyond the Democratic Maze,” are available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0FSywObIwTw&t=72s

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DtR7I77VFYo

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6nWfUOflFog

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZKXfJ8_1wZI

[4] Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future, 1979; Democracy: the Unfinished Journey, 1992; The Cunning of Unreason, 2000; Setting the People Free: The Story of Democracy, 2005.

[5] Ibid., pp. 151-152

[6] Ibid., p. 156.

[7] Ibid, p. 9.

[8] Ibid., p. 83

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., p. 135

[11] Ibid. p. 10

[12] Ibid. p. 14

[13] Ibid., pp. 17-18

[14] Ibid., p. 145

[15] Ibid. p. 24.

[16] Ibid., p. 132.

[17] Ibid, p. 28

[18] Ibid. p. 33.

[19] Ibid, p. 129

[20] Ibid., p. 131

[21] Ibid., p. 53

[22] Ibid., p. 69

[23] Ibid., p. 162

The Critique of Justice

Justice is not a free-standing virtue. It needs to be backed up by other virtues, if it is to be a virtue at all. Justice alone is cold and potentially deadly. It can and does kill (think of the death penalty); it does not nourish, vitalize, and revive. It can punish a murderer but cannot bring the victims back to life. Justice is not truly redemptive.

Justice is the institutionalized form of revenge.

Justice is a minimal virtue. It spells out a required minimum in the relations between us. It defines what must not be the case but cannot say what may be. Justice is the virtue of lawyers and law-courts.

Justice is the virtue of a vengeful god. It is an essentially Calvinist virtue. Our persistent  concern with it reveals the secret power a certain kind of Protestant way of thinking.

Justice is a mean virtue. It aims at a mean in the relation between humans. It is a calculating virtue. It asks: what do I owe you and what do you owe me. No more than that. It sees to it that the terms of the contract between us are satisfied.

Justice is necessary but it is never enough. We also need love, compassion, gratitude, good will, grace, and friendship. These virtues outshine justice whose ultimately value is utilitarian. Justice can only provide the platform on which a genuinely human life is to be lived. It cannot generate that life.

Our singular preoccupation with justice is a testimony to the poverty of our social reality.