Stuart Hampshire’s book Innocence and Experience from 1989 is one of my favorite works in philosophy. Hampshire’s star in philosophy seems to have faded somewhat, but his work deserves our continued attention. Innocence and Experience is an original and provocative work of philosophy. It is also a testament to its author’s humanity, experience, and wisdom.
The book brings together and elaborates ideas about morality that Hampshire had first voiced in earlier years. It has illuminating things to say about the importance of conditional judgments in morality and elsewhere, about the difference between substantive and procedural justice, and the role of imagination in moral thinking. Hampshire’s critique of Aristotle’s psychology with its overemphasis on reason is well-taken. So is his criticism of Hune’s detached treatment of morality. And so is also his critique of John Rawls’ attempt to pin down substantive principles of justice.
Hampshire is particularly clear-sighted on the difference between morality and politics. “Observation of the politics of the immediate pre-war years, ” he writes, “first made me think about the unavoidable split in morality between the acclaimed virtues of innocence and the undeniable virtues of experience.” And he complains that “most Anglo-American academic books and articles have a fairy-tale quality because the realities of politics, both contemporary and past politics, are absent from them.” With his background as a diplomat as well as a philosopher, Hampshire is keenly aware of the difficulty of maneuvering the gap between moral principles and the practical necessities of human politics. There is, he thinks, no theoretical resolution of that issue. “Once again the philosophical point to be recorded is that there is no completeness and no perfection to be found in morality.”
Hampshire’s view of our moral virtues and capacities is expansive: “Courage, a capacity for love and friendship, a disposition to be fair and just, good judgment in practical and political affairs, a creative imagination, generosity, sensibility: tese are all dispositions and capacities which are grounds for praising men and women.” But we know, he adds that historical circumstances and personal preferences and choices limit our ability to pursue all those virtues at once. Some of them are, indeed, incompatible. “Lopsidedness is a fact of human history and therefore a fact of human nature.”
What I appreciate most in the book is that Hampshire is writing from a broad range of human experience. His book gives testimony to a mature and humane wisdom as well as to exceptional philosophical acumen.
I remember Stuart Hampshire with gratitude as a friend and mentor and teacher of philosophy.