Hans Sluga Blog

Wittgenstein and von Humboldt on the description of the world

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus begins with two stark assertions about the world and these are followed by a series of further remarks on the same topic later in the text. These assertions deserve more attention than our interpreters have given them so far because they open up to some of the deepest layers of the Tractatus as I have tried to show in an essay entitled “Wittgenstein’s World.” I now want to turn to a second, closely connected topic that Wittgenstein also addresses in the Tractatus that calls equally for more examination. It is the topic of our relation to the world. The Tractatus speaks of this in three interconnected ways. Where the book had begun with an assertion about the world being all that is the case, it ends with the admonition that we must “see the world rightly.” (TLP, 6.54) Throughout the Tractatus as well as in later writings, Wittgenstein speaks of the seeing of things and of seeing them in the right way. We should therefore ask what it means to see the world in the right way. Second, Wittgenstein also talks in the Tractatus of our view or views of the world. There is, he says, a modern view of the world (Weltanschauung): “At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanation of natural phenomena.” By contrast “the ancients,” i.e., the world view of the ancients, stopped with God and Fate as unassailable. Both the moderns and the ancients, Wittgenstein adds, “are right and wrong.” “But the ancients were clearer, in so far as they recognized one clear terminus, whereas the modern system makes it appear as though everything were explained.” (TLP 6.371-6.372) Somewhat later he remarks on the same topic: “The view of the world sub specie aeterni is its view as a – limited – whole.” (TLP, 6.45 The notion of a world view is again one that Wittgenstein comes back to in other writings. We want to ask what a world view consists in, according to him, what it means to have a world view, and what it is to see the world as a limited whole.

Finally, the Tractatus speaks of descriptions of the world. “Newtonian mechanics,” we read, “brings the description of the world (Weltbeschreibung) to a unified form.” In the unusually detailed passage 6.341, Wittgenstein imagines different nets superimposed on a surface of irregular spots. Each net can be used to give a description of the surface “in a unified form.” The form of the net, he asserts, is arbitrary but a description of the surface in terms of one net may be simpler than one in terms of another net and for that reason presumably preferable. “To the different networks correspond different systems of describing the world. Mechanics determines one form of the description of the world.” And in conclusion, he emphasizes once again: “Mechanics is an attempt to construct all true propositions that we need for the description of the world according to one single plan.” (TLP, 6.343)

My intention here is to focus first of all on the notion of a description of the world and to work myself forward to an examination of the notion of world view as Wittgenstein uses it, and to raise finally the question what it means to see the world rightly.

Von Humboldt’s Weltbeschreibung

In 1827, Alexander von Humboldt, the famous explorer of the Americas and natural scientist, delivered a much-acclaimed series of lectures in Paris and Berlin in which he sought to bring his entire knowledge of the natural world together into a single narrative account. Almost twenty years later he began to work this material into the form of a book. Its first volume appeared in 1845. Three others followed in the years up to 1859. To indicate the scope and intention of the work von Humboldt revived a term from Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy and called his book: Kosmos. “What provided me the main impetus,” he wrote, “was the desire to see the manifestations of bodily things in their general context, nature as a whole moved and animated by inner forces.” He had, so he added, initially conceived of a description of the earth (an Erdbeschreibung) based on the knowledge he had gathered in his journeys. But his perspective had widened and he was now trying to give an account encompassing everything on earth and in the heavens and so he subtitled his book: Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung which we might translate as “Project design for a description of the physical world.”

To von Humboldt’s surprise, his book became an instant bestseller, was quickly translated into the major European languages, and reprinted a number of times during the following decades. After that it was largely forgotten, surpassed by new scientific discoveries and attitudes. But more recently the book has gained some new readers because of its holistic and ecological perspective. In the present context, Humboldt’s work is of interest to me because of the light in throws on Wittgenstein’s use of the somewhat unusual term “Weltbeschreibung.” This is not to suggest that Wittgenstein had read von Humboldt’s work. I am unaware of any evidence to that effect. But given the fame of the work we should not exclude the possibility. Von Humboldt’s thinking and terminology may also, of course, have reached Wittgenstein in another, more indirect fashion. His remarks on the topic of a world description anticipate, in any case, some of Wittgenstein’s thoughts though they also diverge from him in other significant respects. But I assume that Wittgenstein’s thinking on the topic profited in both respects either directly or indirectly from von Humboldt’s treatment.

Von Humboldt’s animating thought was that of the world as a whole. He wanted to achieve, as he put it, “insight into the order of the universe (Weltall).” In the third volume he restated the point once more by explaining that “the main principle of my work … is contained in the drive to understand the phenomena of the world as a principle of nature, to show how in particular groups of these phenomena their shared determination has been recognized, i.e., the rule of great laws, and how one rises from these laws to the investigation of their original interconnection.” Von Humboldt was clear that natural science would always have to do with the investigation of particulars. The project of a world-description was by no means itself a science. “What I call a physical world-description … does therefore not lay claim to the rank of a rational science of nature; it is a thoughtful reflection on the empirical phenomena as a natural whole (als eines Naturganzen).” He even called his book at times very modestly “conversations about nature.” He also spoke of it as a poetic and artistic work and as nature painting (Naturgemälde), analogous, perhaps, to a landscape painting. Von Humboldt was not even sure whether we could ever come up with a complete world-description and he certainly didn’t assume that he was giving one. The natural sciences are still developing, he wrote, and their researches may never come to an end. Often we lack knowledge of the causal relations. The kind of world description that was now possible was therefore, in fact, “only in some parts a world-explanation. The two expressions can as yet not be considered to mean the same.” For all these reasons, von Humboldt called his book a mere “Entwurf” for a world-description – a project design, as I translate the term; we might also say a sketch.

He qualified his project moreover, by calling it a “physical” world-description or a description of the physical world. It was the material universe that concerned him, not any separate ideal or spiritual reality. But he wanted to describe this physical world in an integral manner from the most distant stars to the smallest plants on earth. His account was meant to unite the “uranological and telluric spheres,” as he put it, the astronomical and the terrestrial domain as well as their interconnection. He saw human life, moreover, as part of this whole, not as separated from it. “Nature is for thoughtful reflection a unity in a multiplicity, a combination of a manifold in form and mixture, an encompassing notion of natural object and natural forces as a living whole.” The human species reworks the material that the sense present and “the products of such mental labor belong just as essential to the domain of the cosmos as the internally reflected phenomena.’’ The diversity of human cultures and human languages are part of the cosmic whole. “World-description and world-history are for that reason located in the same experiential plain.”

While he considered the project of a physical world-description as new, von Humboldt assumed that even our most primitive ancestors had a dark feeling “of the unity of the natural powers, of the mysterious tie that connect the sensory and the supersensory.” But in the absence of sufficient empirical knowledge, these world views had been expressed in numerous, different, and sometimes fantastic forms. In the Introduction to his first volume von Humboldt promised, among other things, a “history of world views, i.e., of the gradual dawning of the concept of the interaction of forces in nature as a whole.” In the end he limited himself, however, to a summary account of this development from the early Greeks to Newton. The ancient Greeks had initially venerated “the rule of spiritual powers in human form.” More abstract forms of world view had been developed by the Ionian and Pythagorean philosophers. Von Humboldt treated with sympathy, in particular, the Aristotelian view of the world but then jumped quickly to an “expansion of cosmic views” in the 13th and 14th century. With a mere reference to Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus and his Liber Cosmographicus, and Peter d’Ailly, he jumped to Giordano Bruno, Kepler and his Mysterium cosmographicum, Descartes and his Traité du Monde, and from there to what he called Newton’s “immortal work.” Newton, he wrote, had taken an essential step in the development of world views; he had “elevated physical astronomy into a solution of one of the great problems of mechanics, a mathematical science.” His words made clear that he saw Newton as a forerunner to his own physical world description.

Two points stand out in von Humboldt’s story. The first is his pre-occupation with the concepts of unity, oneness, wholeness, of “inner links between the universal and the particular.” He would sometimes speak of this totality (Weltall, Naturganzes) in a scientific spirit as held together by universal laws (Weltgesetze), as something to be accounted for in the spirit of Newton with the help of a mathematized science of mechanics; but he would also allow himself at times a more Romantic characterization of this totality as a “living whole,” as something built on a world plan (Weltplan) and embodying an all-encompassing idea (Weltgedanke).

The second important is that he considered this concern with the totality of the world a an essential human drive for “the first, highest, and inner purpose of intellectual activity consists in the discovery of natural laws, the exploration of the orderly structure of natural formations, insight into the necessary connection of all changes in the universe.” But contemplation of the world as a unity had in addition a still deeper meaning. It gives aesthetic (and implicitly moral) satisfaction. Nature, von Humboldt wrote “is the realm of freedom” and it can provide us with a deep sense of freedom. What we call the enjoyment of nature is entrance in to this freedom (Eintritt in das Freie).” The early pages of von Humboldt’s Kosmos are for that reason devoted to impress on his readers the idea of the enjoyment of nature. This enjoyment is by no means diminished, it is, in fact, deepened, by a proper scientific understanding of the world.

The Wittgenstein Project

My project is simple but demanding. I am trying to reread Wittgenstein from the beginning without, however, relying on any established interpretations. My question is whether we can look at his work with fresh eyes. Ignoring the halo of secondary writing that now surrounds that work does not mean that I will always end up disagreeing with what previous interpreters have said. But my plan is to re-discover their insights where they are such and otherwise go my own way.

In doing this, I want to look more thoroughly at Wittgenstein’s own words than has previously been done. I don’t know how far I will get with this but completeness is not my goal. It is rather to start with the first sentence of the Tractatus and work myself forward from there as far as I can manage.

This will obviously be slow going, So far I have not got far beyond the first sentence of the Tractatus. Thinking about any particular sentence or phrase will, of course, often take me both backwards and forwards in Wittgenstein’s writings. So my approach will be less atomistic than it might sound. As far as my thoughts on the first sentence go, I have put two things down in this website. There is a power point file on the topic (in English) and there is the text of a lecture on it (in German).

I am about to add part of a third piece that explores Wittgenstein’s notion of a “world description.”

Who am I?

Rene Descartes said famously that I am a thinking substance and thus, presumably, that every self or subject is a thinking substance. That claim is, however, flawed. Does the statement that I believe this or that mean that there is a substance somewhere that believes this or that? Does the claim that I am in pain mean that there is a substance somewhere that is in pain? In these two cases we are not making factual statements about substances but we are affirming a belief of our own and expressing our own pain. Wittgenstein concluded that we don’t, in fact, use the word “I” to refer to anything. There is no such thing as the I, the self, or subject that the word “I” could refer to. Following Lichtenberg, he suggested that our grammar may mislead us. We tend to assume that a noun has meaning always by referring to some object and we hold that the same is true of the pronoun “I.” But both assumptions are wrong. We should think, instead, of sentences like “I am in pain,” Lichtenberg said, as we do of “It is raining.” In the latter case there is obviously no it that does the raining and so, similarly, we should conclude that there is no I that has the pain.

But this Lichtenberg-Wittgenstein view has difficulties of its own. Let us grant that we say “I am in pain” in order to express pain. Wittgenstein goes so far in this case as to maintain that we could actually replace the sentence with a moan to the same effect and thus with something that doesn’t contain the word “I” at all. But what about “Yesterday, I was in terrible pain”? This must be a true or false statement about an incidence of pain. It is certainly not an expression of pain. But the statement doesn’t mean that somewhere or other there was terrible pain yesterday. It means to say that I was the one who suffered. But who then is that I?

When I am asked who I am, I will usually recite certain facts about myself. But when I think about myself, I think rather of my life experiences, my hopes and aspirations. Others may identify me with some external characteristics: the appearance of my face, the sound of my voice, certain characteristic ways of moving. To myself I am, however, someone with certain experiences, feelings, memories, thoughts etc. And here I get back to the theme of privacy, to the fact that the large body of my experiences, feelings, memories, thoughts, etc. is not in practice accessible to others. The one who I am is not a substance with its own identity from the first moment of my existence. I become myself, I become who I am, rather, in the course of my life, as experiences, feelings, memories, thoughts accumulate. But this being who I have become is not fully transparent to others. I relate to it in a way in which I don’t relate to anyone else. I am a being with hidden, secreted corners and I am aware that others are in this respect just like me. (The question of the nature of the self and that of the degree to which our sensations, feelings, thoughts are private belong thus together.) Click here

In proposing this view, I am turning one of Wittgenstein’s arguments on its head. It is one of the few explicit arguments in his Tractatus – one that concern the self or subject. Wittgenstein argues in that passage that there cannot be a thinking self. Such a self, he says, would have to be simple, but a thing that thinks must have an internal complexity in order to entertain thoughts since facts and propositions have both a complex structure. I want to turn this argument around and conclude that a thinking self cannot be a simple substance but must be complex and that its complexity is determined by the complexity of its experiences, feelings, memories, thoughts.

One conclusion Descartes and his followers drew from their picture of the self as a simple substance was that this self could not come into existence or cease to exist through the normal processes of growth and decay. These would be always processes of composition and decomposition but in a simple substance there would be neither. This seemed to him to give us some assurance of the immortality of the soul. The alternative picture of a complex soul or subject allows us, on the other hand, to see this subject precisely as something that is formed in a natural way and that dissolves again in a natural fashion as our experiences, feelings, memories, thoughts disintegrate and fade away.

Wittgenstein on the Puzzle of Privacy

“In what sense are my sensations private? – Well, only I know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. – In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word ‘to know’ as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people often know when I am in pain. – Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself! – It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean – except perhaps that I am in pain.”

Readers of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations will be familiar with this intriguing passage (PI, 246). But there are reasons for being dissatisfied with it. Wittgenstein’s argument appears effective against those who postulate an absolute division between body and mind. But this hardly exhausts what we need to say on the topic of the privacy of sensations, feelings, experiences, memories, thoughts, etc. Yes, it is true that people often know when another person is in pain. But even more often they don’t. We might grant Wittgenstein that sensations, feelings, etc. are not in principle private, but practically they often are. And that they are, we might add, is practically inevitable. Much of what goes on in us never sees daylight. Do I tell people all my dreams and if I do, will I succeed in communicating to them what made them disturbing or funny? Do others know what I feel and think when I shave myself in the morning in front of the mirror? Do I speak of the twinge in my ankle as I walk to work? Do I communicate all the associations and memories that some words in a book evoke in me? None of this happens and others could not even in principle come to know all these things about me. Nor do I or could I know all that they think and feel and experience in their lives.

Hence, the disconnect that always exists between us. As a result, there is an element of uncertainty in all our social relations. There is the reality of misunderstanding, also of coldness and cruelty. Yes, Wittgenstein is right when he writes that it is possible to see that another person is in pain. In such cases, there is no question of a laborious inference from the person’s behavior to his feeling. The pain is manifest in the sufferer. But Wittgenstein passes over the fact that we do just as often not see that pain. Or we may see it in someone close to us and fail to notice it in a stranger. This disconnect produces frictions in our relations with each other. It leads to breakdowns of friendships and marriages. At the level of politics, it produces hostility and war. Over the course of human evolution, our inner life has, no doubt, become increasingly richer and therefore more difficult to discern for others. At the same time, we have learned to expand the range of our words and the vocabulary of our gestures so as to be able to communicate more effectively with each other. The inner life and the external expression bear, moreover, reciprocally on each other. My most private thoughts are, no doubt, shaped by the words I have learned from others and the words I use are imbued with feeling. The boundary between the inner and the outer is thus blurred. That is something, Wittgenstein establishes, no doubt, in his reflections on privacy. But there still exists a boundary and that it exists gives shape to our social practices and our political institutions. Privacy is a political issue precisely because it is a practical fact and that is something Wittgenstein has failed to notice.

There goes philosophy — Claremont Graduate University closes its philosophy program

The Digital media outlet INSIDE HIGHER ED reports that Claremont Graduate University has just closed down its philosophy department. “We were each given the day before an offer to continue as contract employees,” one of the two tenured professors in the department said, according to the report. “The offers were unacceptable in form and content, and presented as take-it-or-be-fired. We ignored them and got fired the next day.” According to the interim university president of Claremont Graduate University, Jacob Adams, the decision was “in recognition of a unique combination of market, enrollment and limited faculty resources that militated against the program’s sustainability, even academic viability.” According to Adams, the trustees considered that Claremont “is not a comprehensive university,” but rather a “graduate university offering degrees in selected fields with unique programs of study and opportunities to study across disciplinary boundaries.” In this spirit, Claremont is now undertaking “a process of program reprioritization.” The university’s news release cites a number of other institutions to have closed graduate programs in recent in years, and such closures — for reasons similar to those at Claremont — are on the rise. Click here

The implications of this decision are surely complex. There is no doubt that there are too many Philosophy Ph.D.’s being produced and too many Ph.D. programs churning them out. Just a few years ago, Berkeley advertised one position in philosophy and received some 600 applications. That year there were 300 job openings in philosophy altogether in the US. Some of the Berkeley applicants may, of course, have already been teaching somewhere, but we must assume that many of them were left without a job. The closure of Claremont’s small philosophy department will not make much difference to this situation. But it may indicate that a larger retrenchment is on the way and that is surely to be welcomed.

At the same time, such a retrenchment will mean a reduction in the number of teaching positions available and this spells trouble for those who are now getting ready to enter the job market. It is, moreover, far from clear that we are facing only a limited retrenchment. The humanities as a whole are now under pressure. One reason for this are steeply increasing tuition fees. These force students to concentrate on subjects that promise well-paid employment. They also induce them to cut their time to a degree to a minimum and thus makes them forgo the luxury of taking courses in the humanities including philosophy. The number of humanities and philosophy majors has been sinking as a result across the country and so has the enrollment in humanities and philosophy courses meant for non-majors. Meanwhile, newly emerging technical subjects are in need of funding which they may seek to cover by stripping or eliminating other programs in their Universities.

We can’t put all the blame, however, on outside forces. Philosophy and the humanities in general need to rethink where they are and what they are doing. Too often their work has become an insider business. A re-orientation is called for. If we are lucky, the current pressure on these programs will help to bring this about. But there is no guarantee.

Disinformation: An Epistemology for the Digital Age

Here is part of a report on “Artificial Intelligence and International Security” that addresses some of the issues that an epistemology for the digital age needs to consider.

Artificial Intelligence and
International Security
By Michael C. Horowitz, Gregory C. Allen,
Edoardo Saravalle, Anthony Cho,
Kara Frederick, and Paul Scharre

Center for a New American Security
July 2018

Information Security

The role of AI in the shifting threat landscape has serious implications for information security, reflecting the broader impact of AI, through bots and related systems in the information age. AI’s use can both exacerbate and mitigate the effects of disinformation within an evolving information ecosystem. Similar to the role of AI in cyber attacks, AI provides mechanisms to narrowly tailor propaganda to a targeted audience, as well as increase its dissemination at scale – heightening its efficacy and reach. Alternatively, natural language understanding and other forms of machine learning can train computer models to detect and filter propaganda content and its amplifiers. Yet too often the ability to create and spread disinformation outpaces AI-driven tools that detect it.

Targeted Propaganda and Deep Fakes

Computational propaganda inordinately affects the current information ecosystem and its distinct vulnerabilities. This ecosystem is characterized by social media’s low barriers to entry, which allow anonymous actors – sometimes automated – to spread false, misleading or hyper-partisan content with little accountability. Bots that amplify this content at scale, tailored messaging or ads that enforce existing biases, and algorithms that promote incendiary content to encourage clicks point to implicit vulnerabilities in this landscape.9 MIT researchers’ 2018 finding that “falsehood [diffuses] significantly farther, faster, deeper and more broadly” than truth on Twitter, especially regarding political news, further illustrates the risks of a crowded information environment.10 AI is playing an increasingly relevant role in the information ecosystem by enabling propaganda to be more efficient, scalable, and widespread.11 A sample of AI-driven techniques and principles to target and distribute propaganda and disinformation includes:

• Exploitation of behavioral data – The application of AI to target specific audiences builds on behavioral data collection, with machine learning parsing through an increasing amount of data. Metadata generated by users of online platforms – often to paint a picture of consumer behavior for targeted advertising – can be exploited for propaganda purposes as well.12 For instance, Cambridge Analytica’s “psychographic” micro-targeting based off of Facebook data used online footprints and personality assessments to tailor messages and content to individual users.13

• Pattern recognition and prediction – AI systems’ ability to recognize patterns and calculate the probability of future events, when applied to human behavior analysis, can reinforce echo chambers and confirmation bias.14 Machine learning algorithms on social media platforms prioritize content that users are already expected to favor and produce messages targeted at those already susceptible to them.15

• Amplification and agenda setting – Studies indicate that bots made up over 50 percent of all online traffic in 2016.16 Entities that artificially promote content can manipulate the “agenda setting” principle, which dictates that the more often people see certain content, the more they think it is important.17 Amplification can increase the perception of significance in the public mind. Further, if political bots are “written to learn from and mimic real people,” according to computational propaganda researchers Samuel Woolley and Philip Howard, then they stand to influence the debate. For example, Woolley and Howard point toward the deployment of political bots that interact with users and attack political candidates, weigh in on activists’ behavior, inflate candidates’ follower numbers, or retweet specific candidates’ messaging, as if they were humans.18 Amplifying damaging or distracting stories about a political candidate via “troll farms” can also change what information reaches the public. This can affect political discussions, especially when coupled with anonymity that reduces attribution (and therefore accountability) to imitate legitimate human discourse.19

• Natural language processing to target sentiment – Advances in natural language processing can leverage sentiment analysis to target specific ideological audiences.”20 Google’s offer of political interest ad targeting for both “left-leaning” and “right-leaning” users for the first time in 2016 is a step in this direction.21 By using a systemic method to identify, examine, and interpret emotional content within text, natural language processing can be wielded as a propaganda tool. Clarifying semantic interpretations of language for machines to act upon can aid in the construct of more emotionally relevant propaganda.22 Further, quantifying user reactions by gathering impressions can refine this propaganda by assessing and recalibrating methodologies for maximum impact. Private sector companies are already attempting to quantify this behavior tracking data in order to vector future microtargeting efforts for advertisers on their platforms. These efforts are inherently dual-use – instead of utilizing metadata to supply users with targeted ads, malicious actors can supply them with tailored propaganda instead.

• Deep fakes – AI systems are capable of generating realistic-sounding synthetic voice recordings of any individual for whom there is a sufficiently large voice training dataset.23 The same is increasingly true for video.24 As of this writing, “deep fake” forged audio and video looks and sounds noticeably wrong even to untrained individuals. However, at the pace these technologies are making progress, they are likely less than five years away from being able to fool the untrained ear and eye.

Countering Disinformation

While no technical solution will fully counter the impact of disinformation on international security, AI can help mitigate its efficiency. AI tools to detect, analyze, and disrupt disinformation weed out nefarious content and block bots. Some AI-focused mitigation tools and examples include:

• Automated Vetting and Fake News Detection – Companies are partnering with and creating discrete organizations with the specific goal of increasing the ability to filter out fake news and reinforce known facts using AI. In 2017, Google announced a new partnership with the International Fact-Checking Network at The Poynter Institute, and MIT’s the Fake News Challenge resulted in an algorithm with an 80 percent success rate.25 Entities like AdVerif.ai scan and detect “problematic” content by augmenting manual review with natural language processing and deep learning.26 Natural language understanding to train machines to find nefarious content using semantic text analysis could also improve these initiatives, especially in the private sector.

• Trollbot Detection and Blocking – Estimates indicate the bot population ranges between 9 percent and 15 percent on Twitter and is increasing in sophistication. Machine learning models like the Botometer API, a feature-based classification system for Twitter, offer an AI-driven approach to identify them for potential removal.27 Reducing the amount of bots would de-clutter the information ecosystem, as some political bots are created solely to amplify disinformation, propaganda, and “fake news.”28 Additionally, eliminating specific bots would reduce their malign uses, such as for distributed denial-of-service attacks, like those propagated by impersonator bots throughout 2016.29

• Verification of Authenticity – Digital distributed ledgers and machine speed sensor fusion to certify real-time information and authenticity of images and videos can also help weed out doctored data. Additionally, blockchain technologies are being utilized at non-profits like PUBLIQ, which encrypts each story and distributes it over a peer-to-peer network to attempt to increase information reliability.30 Content filtering often requires judgement calls due to varying perceptions of truth and the reliability of information. Thus, it is difficult to create a universal filter based on purely technical means, and it is essential to keep a human in the loop during AI-driven content identification. Technical tools can limit and slow disinformation, not eradicate it.

References

9 Zeynep Tufekci, “YouTube, The Great Radicalizer,” The New York Times, March 10, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.html.
10 Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy and Sinan Aral, “The spread of true and false news online,”
Science Magazine, 359 no. 6380 (March 9, 2018), 1146-1151.
11 Miles Brundage et al., “The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention
and Mitigation,” (University of Oxford, February 2018), 16, https://maliciousaireport.com/.
12 Tim Hwang, “Digital Disinformation: A Primer,” The Atlantic Council, September 25, 2017, 7,

Digital Disinformation: A Primer

13 Toomas Hendrik Ilves, “Guest Post: Is Social Media Good or Bad for Democracy?”, Facebook
Newsroom, January 25, 2018, https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/01/ilves-democracy/; and
Sue Halpern, “Cambridge Analytica, Facebook and the Revelations of Open Secrets,” The New
Yorker, March 21, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/cambridge-analyticafacebook-and-the-revelations-of-open-secrets.
14 Michael W. Bader, “Reign of the Algorithms: How “Artificial Intelligence” is Threatening Our
Freedom,” May 12, 2016, https://www.gfe-media.de/blog/wpcontent/
uploads/2016/05/Herrschaft_der_Algorithmen_V08_22_06_16_EN-mb04.pdf.
15 Brundage et al., “The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention and
Mitigation,” 46.
16 Igal Zeifman, “Bot Traffic Report 2016,” Imperva Incapsula blog on Incapsula.com, January
24, 2017, https://www.incapsula.com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2016.html.
17 Samuel C. Woolley and Douglas R. Guilbeault, “Computational Propaganda in the United
States of America: Manufacturing Consensus Online,” Working paper (University of Oxford,
2017), 4, http://blogs.oii.ox.ac.uk/politicalbots/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-
USA.pdf; and Samuel C. Woolley and Phillip N. Howard, “Political Communication,
Computational Propaganda, and Autonomous Agents,” International Journal of Communication,
10 (2016), 4885, http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/download/6298/1809.
18 Woolley and Howard, “Political Communication, Computational Propaganda, and
Autonomous Agents,” 4885.
19 Alessandro Bessi and Emilio Ferrara, “Social bots distort the 2016 U.S. presidential election
online discussion,” First Monday, 21 no. 11 (November 2016), 1.
20 Travis Morris, “Extracting and Networking Emotions in Extremist Propaganda,” (paper
presented at the annual meeting for the European Intelligence and Security Informatics
Conference, Odense, Denmark, August 22-24, 2012), 53-59.
21 Kent Walker and Richard Salgado, “Security and disinformation in the U.S. 2016 election:
What we found,” Google blog, October 30, 2017, https://storage.googleapis.com/gweb-uniblogpublish-
prod/documents/google_US2016election_findings_1_zm64A1G.pdf.
22 Morris, “Extracting and Networking Emotions in Extremist Propaganda,” 53-59.
23 Craig Stewart, “Adobe prototypes ‘Photoshop for audio,’” Creative Bloq, November 03, 2016,
http://www.creativebloq.com/news/adobe-prototypes-photoshop-for-audio.
24 Justus Thies et al., “Face2Face: Real-time Face Capture and Reenactment of RGB Videos,”
Niessner Lab, 2016, http://niessnerlab.org/papers/2016/1facetoface/thies2016face.pdf.
25 Erica Anderson, “Building trust online by partnering with the International Fact Checking
Network,” Google’s The Keyword blog, October 26, 2017,
https://www.blog.google/topics/journalism-news/building-trust-online-partnering-internationalfact-
checking-network/; and Jackie Snow, “Can AI Win the War Against Fake News?” MIT
Technology Review, December 13, 2017, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609717/can-aiwin-the-war-against-fake-news/.
26 “Technology,” AdVerif.ai, http://adverifai.com/technology/.
27 Onur Varol et al., “Online Human-Bot Interactions: Detection, Estimation and
Characterization,” Preprint, submitted March 27, 2017, 1, https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.03107.
28 Lee Rainie, Janna Anderson, and Jonathan Albright, “The Future of Free Speech, Trolls,
Anonymity, and Fake News Online,” (Pew Research Center, March 2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/03/29/the-future-of-free-speech-trolls-anonymity-and-fakenews-online/.; and Alejandro Bessi and Emilio Ferr, “Social bots distort the 2016 U.S.
Presidential election online discussion,” First Monday, 21 no. 11 (November 2016),
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/7090/5653.
29 Adrienne Lafrance, “The Internet is Mostly Bots,” The Atlantic, January 31, 2017,
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/bots-bots-bots/515043/.
30 “PUBLIQ goes public: The blockchain and AI company that fights fake news announces the
start of its initial token offering,” PUBLIQ, November 14, 2017,
https://publiq.network/en/7379D8K2.

And how about democracy?

Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die, Crown Publishing, New York 2018

Are we facing today the twilight of democracy? Patrick E. Kennon, a retired CIA analyst, argued this point more than twenty years ago in a book entitled The Twilight of Democracy. On the front of its dustcover it said: “Those societies that continue to allow themselves to be administered by individuals whose only qualification is that they were able to win a popularity contest will go from failure to failure and eventually pass from the scene.” On the back cover it added: “Washington isn’t the problem – Democracy is.” Kennon was convinced that democracy had reached its expiration date even though it was still being touted as an ideology. Democracy, he wrote, “is an earthbound, human creation subject to the entropy of all such creations. It now travels a course of declining relevance much like that of the European monarchy from the power of Elizabeth I to the impotence of Elizabeth II.” (p. 255) Replacing democracy, he foresaw, would be a new elite of experts: military, administrative, and private-sector specialists who would administer the state of the future in a bureaucratic fashion. Under such a scenario, he concluded that by 2050 the developed, first world “would have largely retired its politicians. The internal affairs of the country would be run by faceless but expert bureaucrats under the general supervision of equally faceless representatives of the population as a whole.” (p. 279)

It’s not obvious that Kennon’s vision is coming true. Today we are being ruled by a shaky business man who has convinced his followers that he is a master at making deals. He is also a media figure who has learned to stir their emotions into political frenzy. He may not be much of a democrat but he is also certainly not a faceless expert specialist operating an anonymous bureaucracy. We seem to be traveling on a different road from the one Kennon saw ahead. But he seems to have been proved right in assuming that the future of democracy is by no means assured. The result of this realization has led to a spate of recent books entitled The Crisis of Democracy, The Plot to Destroy America, Democracy in Decline?, How Democracy Ends, and Democracy: The God that Failed.

Levitsky and Ziblatt’s How Democracies Die is another contribution to this genre. Its title is, however, somewhat misleading in that the book is largely concerned with the United States. Its central question is to what extent Donald Trump represents a threat to American democracy and what to do about it – with illustrative references to the failure of democracies in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, post-Communist Russia, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela, and passing references to various other places. This perspective structures but also limits the authors’ discussion of how democracies may fail. Their eye is on internal forces for failure; they are not concerned with the collapse of democracies due to foreign interventions, to military, economic, or environmental disaster, or to ideological and religious rifts. And their explanations are given in psychological terms: the authoritarian personality, the need for toleration and forbearance, the dangers of radical opposition in that it might provoke a political reaction. They do not ask whether there are structural changes in society that are destabilizing the democratic order

Levitsky and Ziblatt see American democracy threatened above all by the rise of an authoritarian figure who is set to undermine existing political institutions and practices. They identify four indicators of authoritarian behavior: 1. Rejection of (or weak commitment to) democratic rules of the game. 2. Denial of the legitimacy of political opponents. 3. Toleration or encouragement of violence. 4. Readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including media. And they then proceed to document all four of these behavior patterns in Donald Trump. Trump is therefore on their view a serious threat to American democracy.

The two authors allow that authoritarian personalities exist in every society but, they argue, healthy democracies have procedures for keeping them in check. These are not, however, to be found in the existence of a written Constitution. “There is nothing in our Constitution or our culture,” they write, “to immunize us against democratic breakdown.” (p. 204) Other checks are needed to bring this about. The first is the fostering of a spirit of toleration and forbearance. If democracy is to work, political opponents must be respected as citizens and not be treated as enemies to be suppressed. And politicians need to restrain the use of their power so a not to undermine the democratic system for the sake of their own cause. In Levitsky and Ziblatt’s telling, the Republican and Democratic Parties have in the past served as “guardrails” that have kept American democracy in place by fostering these two fundamental political virtues. Through a process of selection and vetting of presidential candidates, the two parties have managed to keep authoritarians more or less at bay. The existence of political parties has thus proved essential for the survival of democracy. But the Republican and Democratic Parties have become less powerful in recent decades and they have therefore increasingly lost their guardrail function. This is due, the two authors think, to a polarization affecting all of American society and politics. “The weakening of our democratic norms is rooted in extreme polarization – one that extends beyond policy differences into an existential conflict over race and culture. America’s efforts to achieve racial equality as our society grows increasingly diverse have fueled an insidious reaction and intensifying polarization. And if one thing is clear from studying breakdowns throughout history, it’s that extreme polarization can kill democracies.” (p. 9)

The authors sketch three possible scenarios for post-Trump America. The first, optimistic one, is that Trump will fail and that the Trump interlude will be “taught in schools, recounted in films, and recited in historical works as an era of tragic mistakes where catastrophe was avoided and American democracy saved.” (p. 206) But they are not convinced that the end of Trump’s presidency will be enough to restore a healthy democracy. “A second much darker future is one in which President Trump and the Republicans continue to win with a white nationalistic appeal.” (p. 207) This would, of course, not be possible in a democratic way. Levitsky and Ziblatt are, however, convinced that – conceivable as it is – “such a nightmare scenario isn’t likely.” (p. 208) There remains a third possibility. “The third, and in our view, most likely post-Trump future is one marked by polarization, more departures from unwritten political conventions, and increasing institutional warfare – in other words, democracy without solid guardrails.” (p. 208) Levitsky and Ziblatt call this also a scenario in which democracy is left in a half-life state.

They proceed to consider how such a development may be prevented. They argue that it would be wrong for the opposition to use the same hardball tactics adopted by Trump and his Republican followers. They write: “In our view, the idea that Democrats should ‘fight like Republicans’ is misguided. First of all, evidence from other countries suggest that such a strategy often plays directly into the hands of authoritarians. Scorched-earth tactics often erode support for the opposition by scaring off moderates. And they unify progovernment forces, as even dissidents within the incumbent party close ranks in the face of an uncompromising opposition. And when the opposition fights dirty, it provides the government with justification for cracking down.” (pp. 215-216) The advice seems plausible, but it fails to address the question whether there will not be a point at which only all-out opposition can be effective. Clearly, America is not at this point and so Levitsky and Ziblatt’s reasonably suggest that “opposition to the Trump administration’s authoritarian behavior should be muscular but it should seek to preserve, rather than violate, democratic rules and norms. Where possible, opposition should center on Congress, the courts, and, of course, elections.” (pp. 217-218) So, not violence in the streets, but maintenance of the democratic values of toleration and forbearance in the building of broad opposition coalitions.

But the two authors understand that resistance to the abuses of the Trump administration is not enough. They believe, rather, that “the fundamental problem facing American democracy remains extreme partisan division – one fueled not just by policy differences but by deeper sources of resentment, including racial and religious differences.” They are convinced that “America’s great polarization preceded the Trump presidency, and it is very likely to endure beyond it.” (p. 220) They see the Republican Party as the main driver of the political chasm that has opened up. Hence: “Reducing polarization requires that the Republican Party be reformed, if not refounded outright.” (p. 223) And Democrats must address the problem of economic and social inequality. “The very health of our democracy hinges on it.” (p. 230)

Important as these considerations are, Levitsky and Ziblatt do not pursue them far enough to come to a compelling analysis of the state of democracy in the 21st century and particularly that of US American democracy. One obstacle on the way is their tendency to describe the situation in binary terms, as if there was a clear choice between being authoritarian and being democratic. Neither authoritarianism nor democracy is one thing; there are different degrees and forms of each and the two even occasionally overlap as in the so-called peoples-democracies of the Soviet era. Moreover, not every form of government is viable at any given moment. There are external constraints that make one system more viable than another at a given time. Thus, the radical democracy known to the Athenian state of the fourth century is not possible for us. Levitsky and Ziblatt follow mainline American thinking when they conceive the matter in an essentially voluntarist fashion. It is all a matter of choice for them. We must get ourselves into the right (democratic and anti-authoritarian) state of mind and then act according to its dictates. It’s all a matter of good will.

But we should ask ourselves what the constraints are under which modern democracy has developed and how and why these may be changing – and how then we are to proceed in this shifting terrain. The rise of Donald Trump is linked to an accumulation of wealth made possible by new technologies, to a globally operating financial system, and to the messaging power of the electronic media. The concentration of power in the hands of authoritarian leaders parallels and is accomplished through the accumulation of economic, financial, and informational power. The important point to understand is that we are not facing just another authoritarian in Donald Trump, but a newly evolving form of authoritarianism. Reforming America’s political parties and striving for greater equality and less polarization may be good things, but they are not enough in the face of a newly forming system of political power.

Political Realism vs. Political Realism

Trump must be a puzzle to our political realists. He certainly shares their scorn for seeing politics in moral terms. Unlike George W. Bush, he doesn’t speak of an axis of evil in the world; and unlike Obama and the Democrats, he is little concerned with the issue of human rights. As an amoral capitalist he believes in self-interest and the exercise of power, in the use and pursuit of money in politics.

But he is also not much interested in the actual political realities. He sticks to a simple picture of what the world is like, despises experts, and ignores advice. In his factual claims he is often quite unrealistic.

Trump makes us understand that the term “political realism” is ambiguous. In one sense it is a general belief about how human beings act and a set of policies derived from this. In another sense it refers to the recognition of the concrete facts on the political ground. Trump shows us that the two don’t necessarily go together. Political realism can, in other words, go hand in hand with a lack of realism.

Donald Trump’s Biggest Mistake

Donald Trump has already made some serious political mistakes. He gave the Israelis their much desired American embassy in Jerusalem without asking for any concessions from them on the thorny Palestinian issue. Not a very good case of deal-making. And in a similar fashion he gave the North Korean leader his sought-after recognition as an international statesman without getting from him any firm commitments on the nuclear issue. There are other such failures but, significant as they may be, none of them is really Trump’s most egregious mistake.

Some people might, of course, argue that Trump’s biggest mistake was to enter politics at all and to run for the presidency. It has certainly become clear by now that he was not and is not qualified for the position. So, he wants to shake things up and be a disruptor. But what is to be put in place when the old order has been destroyed? Trump’s vision is woefully inadequate in this respect. It comes to a recreation of the United States of the 1950’s: predominantly white, equipped with heavy industries, economically and military unchallenged, and conservative in attitudes and tastes. But history doesn’t repeat itself and a quite different constellation of issues face the country now in the 21st millennium.

Trump’s biggest mistake has been and is, rather, his unrelenting aggressiveness. There was, in particular, no reason for him to turn on Barack Obama and make himself the central figure in the so-called “birther” campaign. The whole thing was a fake, in any case. Does it matter whether Obama was born in Hawaii or abroad? He was certainly born as the son of a US citizen and therefore held citizenship rights from the moment of birth. That is all the Constitution demands from an American president. And the claim that Obama was not born where his birth certificate says he was, was an absurdity from the beginning. Given Obama’s popularity then and now Trump’s actions unnecessarily alienated all those for whom Obama was the symbol of a new post-racist America. They have found his anti-Obama agitation utterly unforgivable. The same unnecessary aggressiveness Trump manifested in his campaign against Hillary Clinton with nicknaming her “Crooked Hillary” and leading choruses of “Lock her up.”

We can be sure that the ongoing Russia investigation would not have become such a heated partisan matter without Trump’s animus against Obama and Clinton. He could, of course, have changed his tone once he was elected; but he proved unable for such a gesture. He has injected in this way a new nastiness into American politics and that may well be his biggest mistake and failure in politics.

“The weakening of our democratic norms is rooted in extreme partisan polarization – one that extends beyond policy differences into an existential conflict over race and culture… And if one thing is clear from studying breakdowns throughout history, it’s that extreme polarization can kill democracies.” (Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die)

Robotic Doves Circling over Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon

Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish from 1975 was the first book to raise the question of the surveillance state. The book was about changes in the practice of punishment and how these illustrate the emergence of a modern disciplinary society. But disciplinary society was for Foucault also and above all a society of surveillance. Hence the French title of the book: Surveiller et Punir. Foucault brilliantly illustrated his point by recalling Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon – an architectural design of a prison, conceived by the utilitarian philosopher, that allowed for the continuous surveillance of the prisoners and for their disciplining. In his presentation of this conception Bentham had already suggested its wider uses in schools, hospitals, factories, and workhouses.

Our society has developed much further into a surveillance society since Foucault published his book and certainly since Bentham wrote his treatise on the panopticon in the late 18th century. This has not escaped the attention of social scientists and there exists now an extensive literature on the topic of surveillance. For all that, we still need to reflect much more on this theme.
A useful stimulus to this end comes from a new report on a further step in the development of surveillance drones in the form of robotic birds. In the US, Europe, and China this development is well advanced. The Chinese are, in fact, already using robotic doves extensively in their rebellious Xinyang province. It’s worth looking at this article and the enclosed video from the South China Morning Post:

Click here

And where is Europe? What to do about a receding continent

Donald Trump has exposed the extraordinary weakness of the Europeans. The French president, the German chancellor, and the British foreign secretary all came to Washington at the beginning of May of 2018 to plead for the Iranian nuclear agreement. In order to butter him up, Boris Johnson, the British Foreign Secretary, even proposed Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Nothing made a difference. On May 8, Trump went ahead and abandoned the Iran Deal as he had long said he would. He was obviously more interested in his militant supporters than in the arguments of the Europeans. And to top-off the humiliation he announced immediately afterwards the most severe sanctions on Iran, knowing full well that they would hit European companies more than the American ones. In the face of this affront, the European leaders have met on May 15 to decide on their next move. They duly issued a statement deploring the American action– but did little more. The truth is that they are too weak for anything else.

How different from the beginning of the twentieth century when the Europeans ruled the globe. Their empires and colonies made them rich and important. They still led the world in technology and science. But then they took viciously against each other in the war of 1914-1918, the conflict that the British still like to call the “Great War” as if it was something to brag about. In reality, the British came out as losers just as much as the other European nations. The real winner was the US which, for the first time in history, intervened decisively in European affairs. Twenty years of economic and political turmoil followed. Dictatorships sprang up all over Europe like poisonous mushrooms after the rain. Then came the second round of the European civil war that lasted from 1939 to 1945. By its end, the global power of Europe had dwindled to nothing; its colonial empires were in tatters, the continent was divided between America and Russia and in the West the Americans set themselves up, politically and economically triumphant. Fearful of Soviet expansion, the Europeans agreed to become American vassals and this is essentially where they find themselves still today with the American sphere of influence expanded now to the doorstep of Russia.

The only European leader who ever stood up to the Americans was General Charles de Gaulle who told the American troops in 1966 that it was time to leave France. De Gaulle also withdrew from NATO, to the chagrin of the Americans. Since then, a weaker generation of French politicians have meekly returned to the American-led alliance. Dependence on American military power is one the elements that keeps the Europeans in check. Stoking again and again first the fear of Communism and since then the fear of Russia, the Americans have made themselves indispensable on the European continent. In addition, they have done their utmost to prevent the development of an independent European military force. Not that the Europeans were ever determined enough to regain their military independence. But there was, at least, one moment when they could have done so. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Warsaw Pact, NATO had, in fact, outlived its mission and should have come to an end at this point. But through American guile and European timidity it never happened and now it seems impossible to envisage. NATO has, in the meantime, been given the veneer of an alliance of equals even though the American military commanders still have the last word in it. If it was really an alliance of equals, why are there no European military headquarters in the US?

European submission to American rule is due not only to military weakness. The Europeans remain divided, mutually antagonistic, and unable to overcome their self-mutilating belligerent history. The British still dream of their empire and are willing to forgo real power as an equal in the European Union for the imagined power of a resurrected Commonwealth or as junior partners of the US. The European Union itself proves unable to settle its economic, financial, and political differences. Its leaders are timid and having been brought up in the shadow of America prove unable to think in other categories. The French president Macron may be the only one with sufficient freedom of mind. But one man cannot turn the political wheel around. It will require a new, more independence-minded generation to do so.

Trump’s recent threats of tariffs on European goods have exposed how vulnerable a merchant power can be. If he goes ahead with those threats, Europe will face a dramatic economic downturn with the possibility of deep political troubles. Trump has certainly made it clear that he has no liking for the European Union and is trying to drive its members apart. In this he is following Vladimir Putin’s example. Both aim at weakening the Europeans for what they consider their own advantage. Newly emerging nationalist parties in Europe

Here are some of the things that the Europeans need to do, if they are to maintain themselves in the global environment of the 21st century:

1. They will need new and younger leaders not in the thrall of America. This holds, in particular for the Germans. I have never been an admirer of Angela Merkel but she has definitely now had her day. Her rash action in the migration crisis should really have led to her downfall. It is a sign of Germany’s political stagnation that she is still in office. Needed now are leaders – perhaps like Emmanuel Marcon – who can act with a view to the future. Merkel’s talent has been in a different direction, that of maintaining the status quo with all its costs and benefits. But this is no longer enough. Merkel must go and the sooner, the better.

2. The Europeans will have to bring about greater military and economic independence (and self-sufficiency). They can’t just play at being global merchants and leave their security in the hands of others. NATO must eventually be replaced by a new European military order, but this will take both time and money and determination.

3. The Europeans need also to develop a stronger sense of commonality which will require at the same time a shared re-assessment of their past quarrels. Every existing European nation has been formed through the unification of smaller, regional kingdoms. In this process, many age-old hostilities had to be overcome. The same must be possible on a European scale.

4. The Europeans will need to recalibrate their relation to Russia. They may have reasons to be wary of Russia’s ambitions, but the same is true for America. European interests in Russia are different from America’s. A cool, rational, and clear-sighted policy is necessary with respect to this important neighbor. Some modus vivendi has to be found not least as a counterbalance to America.

5. The Europeans will have to work on minimizing the effects of Brexit in order to keep the UK close to the continental system. They need to convince the British – or, rather, the English – that their best hope in the new global constellation is to maintain close association with their historical neighbors. The English have been less successful so far than their continental neighbors, the Dutch, the French, the Portuguese, in overcoming the loss of their empire. They are caught in a time-warp in which they see themselves at the head of a new global commonwealth when, in fact, no one pines after them. The need to work though their historical loss and come to see that they are, after all, only a midsize European nation whose influence will be greatly diminished once they seek to walk on their own. Perhaps there will be a day when some formal system of co-existence can be re-established.

6. The Europeans also need to combat the emerging nationalist forces among them. They are, in effect, handmaidens of American power. That’s why Donald Trump and the advocates of “America First!” are so keen on supporting these parties. For the sake of an imagined national sovereignty these parties are willing to forego the power of joint action. Absurdly they maintain: Divided we stand, united we fall. These so-called “populists” need to be exposed for what they ultimately are: traitors to their own interest.

But there is, of course, a gap between what needs to be done and what will or what can be done. The 20th century was, in fact, a period of political decline for Europe even though the Europeans came out, at the end, as economically prosperous. It’s not obvious what will become of them in the new millennium.

And where is Europe? What to do about a receding continent

Here are some of the things that the Europeans need to do, if they are to maintain themselves in the global environment of the 21st century: